




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With a Special Retrospective Annex: Instability Patterns and Trends, 1984-86

The Political Instability Quarterly

	August 1986	ILLEGIB
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The Political Instability Quarterly

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With a Special Retrospective Annex: Instability Patterns and Trends, 1984-86

August 1986

Intelligence

This quarterly was produced by and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and suggestions are welcome

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	The Political Instability Quarterly	25 X 1
Preface	This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue covers the period from 1 May through 31 July, examines events and processes that could lead to significant instability, including any one or a combination of the following—irregular regime change, coup d'etat, breakdown of order, major civil war, revolutionary upheaval, or major policy shift. The paper assesses our levels of concern regarding the potential for instability in the short term and over the next two years through the consistent application of 24 indicators. This quarterly includes four parts: • Part 1 presents essays on selected countries in which there have been developments of special interest. Included in each assessment are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative scenarios. • Part 2 includes a brief assessment of the instability outlook in 30 countries, and country-specific tables tracing significant political and economic changes during the past two years. The countries we assess have been selected because they are key US friends or allies, located near strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, geographically close to the United States, or especially salient or influential in the Third World.	
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	of a topic related to instability.	25X1

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The Political Instability Quarterly	25 X 1

Summary: Levels of Concern

The summary chart on the facing page highlights the countries where our concerns about prospects for instability currently are greatest.

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In Latin America our concern for stability in *Peru* has increased as the brutal quelling of rioting by imprisoned Sendero Luminoso insurgents has prompted a major crisis and aggravated already strained relations between President Garcia and the military. Concern about *Chile* is mounting as President Pinochet appears determined to crush growing antiregime protests. In *El Salvador* fighting between government forces and insurgents is likely to increase as both sides try to strengthen their positions before talks later this summer.

Prospects for stability have improved slightly in three Central American countries: *Guatemala*, where the seven-month-old government of President Cerezo has so far retained critical military backing; *Honduras*, where President Azcona is continuing to put civilian-military relations on a more even keel; and *Panama*, where President Delvalle remains subservient to the defense chief, Noriega.

In the Near Eastern-South Asian region, Sudan remains very shaky. Despite some recent improvements—including the installation of an elected, civilian government—this strategic country faces a formidable array of problems, including insurgency in the south and Libyan machinations. Our concerns about Pakistan have increased for the near term, mainly because of the campaign of "street politics" Benazir Bhutto aims to mount later this summer against the Zia-Junejo regime (see Part 1 essay).

Iraq remains high on the instability concern list because of its serious economic problems and because it is bracing for a major Iranian offensive that could produce heavy casualties and aggravate already significant morale problems. Concern about Egypt centers on the prospect that Mubarak may soon impose austerity measures recommended by the International Monetary Fund that risk sparking widespread riots that could result in his fall. Iran's substantial economic problems do not pose an immediate threat to the regime, but they are prompting factional strife, and we are concerned that in the longer term the deteriorating economy combined with other possible developments—such as Khomeini's death or war reversals—could result in significant instability.

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President Babangida's regime in *Nigeria* is in serious trouble. He faces acute ethnic and economic problems and depends on volatile military factions for support. In *South Africa*, the government of President Botha and blacks are locked in an increasing spiral of violence, but the regime retains the backing of the vast majority of whites and has formidable security capabilities (see Part 1 essay).

Concern about South Korea remains at a substantial level, although both the government and the opposition have signaled some flexibility on the contentious issue of a direct presidential election. Elsewhere in East Asia, President Aquino has made some progress toward consolidating power in the Philippines—initiating constitutional reform and cease-fire talks with rebels—but the recent abortive coup underscores the continuing uncertainties in Manila.

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monthly figure to date. Despite Pretoria's claims, the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency in	25X1
June has not appreciably lowered the average number of daily deaths.	25X1
All indicators suggest that the situation in black townships is continuing to degenerate and that many townships are approaching a state of anarchy. South African Government data indicate, for example, a trend toward greater factional violence in the townships, noting that thus far in 1986 more blacks have been killed by other blacks than by security forces. In some townships, government-backed black officials have turned increasingly to vigilante squads to try to reassert control and break the power of black activists, while other townships resemble "liberated areas," where gangs of militant youths calling themselves "comrades" enforce decisions made by people's courts and attack township residents who refuse to take part in protests or boycotts. Throughout these areas, attacks against black policemen, black townships officials, and more moderate blacks in general are justified by asserting that such people are "collaborators."	25X1
spreading to rural areas, including many of the black homelands.	25X1
The government increasingly has argued that, to continue its reform program and permit moderate blacks to come forward and negotiate, the government must first crack down hard to "restore order." Given this strongly held view, we see little likelihood that Pretoria will quickly lift the current state of emergency; the government forced through new security legistation that gives it the power to declare any part of the country an "unrest area" and to detain people for 180 days without trial. Although the government may gradually lighten restrictions on the press and media, we anticipate that the widespread detention of activists, heavy police and Army presence in the townships, and restrictions on black and multiracial political	25 X 1

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Part 1. Countries With **Developments of Special Interest**

South Africa: Into the Laager 1

- The Botha government and the African National Congress (ANC) likely are locked into an increasing spiral of bloody ANC attacks and South African cross-border reprisals.
- Pretoria's decision to carry out such reprisals and to impose a state of emergency reflects its frustration with being unable to end nearly two years of almost constant black unrest and a growing perception in white ruling circles that they must now prepare more intently for "going it alone."
- The government's determination to crack down at home is matched by a willingness to strike more aggressively at neighboring black-ruled states that it accuses of harboring or supporting the ANC. The ANC appears to have launched a campaign of bombings that includes civilian, as well as government, targets.
- The Botha government also must contend with increasing dissatisfaction among whites who believe the government is moving too quickly in its reform program. Although rightwing white groups present no immediate political threat, the ruling National Party will work hard to prevent the erosion of the strong historical and cultural ties between Afrikanerdom and the National Party.

Dealing With the Unrest

• The Botha Government clearly is frustrated by its inability to suppress almost two years of constant black unrest. Over 2,000 people have died in unrestrelated incidents since the most recent violence began in September 1984, according to the respected South African Institute of Race Relations. Some 213 people were killed in May 1986—the highest

The government incre continue its reform pr blacks to come forwar must first crack down this strongly held view Pretoria will quickly li cy; the government for lation that gives it the country an "unrest are days without trial. Alt gradually lighten restr we anticipate that the ists, heavy police and A and restrictions on blac civic, labor, and church groups now constitute at the very least a semipermanent feature of South African political life.

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The Afrikaner equivalent of "circling the wagons."

Black Politics

Pretoria's tough prosecution of emergency regulations-including detention of black activists, a ban on gatherings, press restrictions, and strong security presence in black townships—may succeed in quieting black protest temporarily. We believe that, while many blacks may lie low for some time, antigovernment groups will continue to be active. Some black leaders probably accept Pretoria's crackdown as a direct challenge and will continue efforts to circumvent security measures. The most credible black leaders, in our view, will continue to refuse to participate in talks with the government about constitutional change unless Pretoria releases political prisoners, remove the bans on the ANC and other organizations, and indicates that it will discuss a genuine transfer of power-all conditions that Pretoria is unlikely to consider in the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, Pretoria's crackdown is seriously disrupting day-to-day black politics and labor. For example, leaders of the antiapartheid United Democratic Front in eastern Cape Province, fearing detention, recently broke off negotiations on local issues being held with business and government representatives. Similarly, as black leaders have been primary targets for detention, labor-management relations and contract negotiations have been paralyzed. Retail workers have staged strikes protesting the detention of union leaders, and business leaders have complained that they have no union leaders with whom to negotiate.

Pretoria's belief that it is following the correct path probably will be strengthened by the recent wave of bombings that have hit civilian as well as government targets. Although the ANC has not claimed credit for many of the recent attacks, the use of Soviet limpet mines and landmines in many attacks, the sophistication of several operations, and the absence of other effective guerrilla groups in South Africa strongly suggest that most of the acts are the work of the ANC. We believe the continued shift to civilian targets probably reflects the growing influence of restless, militant, rank-and-file youths opposed to what they see as inaction by the ANC's relatively moderate "old-guard" leadership.



The triple seven AWB symbol, which bears a striking resemblance to a swastika, relates directly to the AWB's identification with Christianity and its efforts to foster group idently. The emblem represents the seven angels, seven stars, and seven seals alluded to in the Revelation of St. John as the antithesis of the 666 that symbolizes the Anti-Christ.

In our judgment, Pretoria is likely to launch attacks against ANC targets in neighboring states—attacks that aim to inflict heavier guerrilla casualties than in the past and that may result in more incidental civilian deaths. South Africa's leading expert on the ANC—a former police intelligence officer—has boasted, for example, that an all-out effort by Pretoria during any given six-week period would wipe out the ANC. Some of President Botha's most influential

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security advisers almost certainly agree with the assessment and probably are counseling the President that just such a tougher policy is needed now.

Rightwing Backlash

Pretoria also must contend with a political challenge to National Party dominance from white rightwing political parties and cultural organizations. Although public opinion polls indicate that a majority of whites support the government's reform program, persistent press reports about the possible release of jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela and reports of possible negotiations with the ANC have fueled concerns among already skittish conservative whites that the National Party is not being firm enough in dealing with black unrest.

Although these groups show no signs of being able to mount a credible challenge to the National Party's hold on the white electorate, the revival of the ultraright Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)—and its courting by more mainline conservative parties—represents a political reality that no white government can ignore. President Botha is likely to attempt to use a National Party Congress this August to gain a renewed party and popular mandate for his twin policies of reform and strict security.

Bracing for Sanctions

Pretoria's willingness to impose harsh security measures in the face of growing international condemnation reflects the government's belief that nothing it is willing to do will satisfy the West or prevent additional economic sanctions. As the pressure for sanctions builds, we expect Pretoria to become more obstinate in refusing to alter the pace of its reforms or to ease security measures. President Botha, for example, has stepped up his stern denunciations of Western attempts to "meddle" in South African affairs. Botha's harsher tone in part reflects Pretoria's feeling that it is being pressed from all sides.

In the short run—the next several years—we believe South Africa is prepared for and probably capable of weathering even comprehensive economic sanctions.

Since the early 1960s, Pretoria has engaged in a program of import substitution and stockpiling that has included borrowing from third-country banks and subterfuge trade. In addition, South Africa has financed some 90 percent of its own capital investment.

Over the longer term, effective sanctions would seriously impede growth and intensify domestic political conflict. Although sanctions initially would help unify whites by involving them in a common struggle against an external enemy, in the long term, economic hardships, coupled with a realization that the world will not tolerate a racially based system, would sharpen political divisions among whites. Sanctions also would delay Botha's reform program, as spending would be diverted from black education and housing to vital industries, and black unemployment almost certainly would rise, intensifying unrest.

Pretoria almost certainly would retaliate for tough international sanctions by imposing a selective blockade against economically dependent neighboring black states. The government has contingency plans to retaliate and magnify the impact of sanctions by squeezing the more vulnerable economies in the region, according to US Embassy sources.

Key Indicators To Watch

Most Likely Scenario: In an attempt to give the appearance of a return to "normalcy," Pretoria begins gradually easing emergency regulations. At the same time, the government pushes ahead with its gradual reform program:

- Black organizations begin to regroup and adapt to life under harsher security measures.
- Pretoria begins to shift from a blanket state of emergency to a more selective application of security laws.
- The government eases some press restriction in an attempt to prove at least a partial return to normal conditions.
- Botha uses the National Party Congress to win a new mandate for his program of government-initiated and controlled reforms.
- Blacks show no signs of accepting government overtures, however.

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
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- Despite Pretoria's statements, unrest-related deaths in the townships remain at roughly pre-state of emergency levels.
- The ANC continues to strike, and Pretoria persists in launching cross-border strikes against ANC facilities in neighboring black-ruled states.

Alternate Scenario: Pretoria—in the face of escalating unrest—cracks down even harder on opposition groups, banning numerous black organizations and lashing out at the ANC and neighbors:

- The Botha regime shows the West the danger of economic sanctions by implementing its own sanctions against its neighbors most critical of its policies, cutting transit facilities, or expelling guest laborers.
- South Africa conducts larger-scale operations against ANC facilities in neighboring countries with less regard to civilian casualties.
- Violence intensifies under the state of emergency and Pretoria attempts to stamp out completely all black opposition by banning groups such as the multiracial United Democratic Front and activist labor unions.

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
Pakistan: Benazir Bhutto Plans "Street Politics" Campaign

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- Prime Minister Junejo faces a difficult summer and autumn. Preoccupied since early spring with the challenge from Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto, the Junejo government is now trying to regain public confidence in its ability to deal with security and law-and-order problems that include a serious, Soviet-inspired sabotage campaign along the border with Afghanistan and rising banditry in Sind.
- Junejo's difficulties are likely to be compounded this fall, when Bhutto is expected to launch a concerted campaign for new party-based elections. Despite a lack of broad support during the annual demonstrations against Zia's imposition of martial law on 5 July, the cooler weather is likely to usher in "street politics" by Bhutto and her party.
- The government probably will be able to contain demonstrations or violence by PPP supporters. If Junejo fails to do so, however, his regime would be in serious trouble. In the worst case, with violence becoming widespread in vital Punjab Province or with public confidence in the Junejo government collapsing, the Army would probably restore martial law.

The Challenge From Bhutto

The three-month honeymoon for the government of Prime Minister Junejo—whose efforts to exert his authority and demonstrate his independence from President Zia had begun to win him popular approval—came to an abrupt end with the return of PPP leader Benazir Bhutto in early April. She demanded that Zia step down as Army chief and called for new party-based elections. Bhutto told US diplomats that the first phase of her campaign—a whirlwind national speaking tour that drew massive, peaceful crowds—was designed not only to prove her popularity but also to demonstrate that she is not a threat to Pakistan's stability. Although she claims to want peaceful



change, Bhutto declares that, if Zia fails to meet her demands, her party will resort to "people power." She told US diplomats she intends to start with small demonstrations—one-hour strikes, one-day fasts—that would increase in frequency but remain nonviolent.

Publicly, Junejo has played down Bhutto's return, refusing to mention her by name while rejecting her call for early elections. In our view, Junejo believes that Bhutto eventually will run out of steam and that a precipitate move against her would be counterproductive. His strategy is to give the PPP the opportunity to discredit itself, believing that PPP-induced violence could be contained. Junejo has not joined with Zia in trying to discredit Bhutto by charging that the PPP's activities are funded by India and Libya. At the same time, Junejo almost certainly sees himself as the "man in the middle" and fears that a Bhutto-Zia confrontation might endanger his position. He has hinted that legal measures—a revision of

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


(center).

legislation governing political activity—might be needed to prevent the PPP from threatening the fledgling civilian system.

Junejo probably sees the modest turnout—much smaller than pre-Ramadan crowds—for the PPP's demonstrations nationwide on the anniversary of the coup against Prime Minister Bhutto as indication that his low-key approach is succeeding. He probably sees the summer—when hot weather will constrain street activity—as an opportune time to put legal restrictions on the People's Party to prevent renewed activity this fall.

Bhutto is likely to see the demonstrations on 5 July more positively—as an indication of widespread popular support for the People's Party even without her presence as a drawing card. She already has set Pakistan's Independence Day, 14 August, as the next national action day. Even if the results on that day are disappointing, we believe that Bhutto is unlikely to abandon plans for further demonstrations this fall. She has demanded that the government hold national elections this fall and almost certainly does not see a conventional, moderate approach—for example, aiming for a show of strength in local elections in



September 1987—as an alternative that would support the credibility of the People's Party. She probably will spend the remainder of the summer working on the party's grassroots organization and making provincial leadership more effective. She may also now be convinced of the need to mend fences with the opposition coalition Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, which boycotted the 5 July demonstrations.

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Pressure on the Western Front

For months, Junejo has been preoccupied with the threat from Bhutto, building up his own Pakistan Muslim League with populist programs rather than needed economic reforms in order to counter the appeal of the People's Party. Meanwhile, according to reporting from the US Embassy, Junejo has been cautious about making decisions that might give the opposition an easy target. Tensions with India have risen because Junejo slowed the pace of rapprochement in the face of potential resistance from the Pakistani business community to the trade measures New Delhi wants. According to reporting from the US Consulate in Karachi, lawlessness in historically troublesome Sind Province rose to embarrassing levels until Junejo finally sent in paramilitary units to round up bandits; he had delayed such a move out of concern that it might be seen as a step toward martial law.

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Junejo also has been slow to address the serious security, law-and-order, and other problems in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The Kabul regime is intensifying its efforts to pressure Islamabad into reining in the Afghan resistance and to reaching an early political settlement to end the insurgency:

- An escalating terrorist campaign claimed over 500 casualties in some 40 bombings between January and June.
- Violations of the Pakistani border by Soviet and Afghan aircraft more than doubled compared with the same period last year, and attacks on insurgent positions along the border increased. Between January and June, almost 200 Pakistanis were killed in cross-border artillery attacks or bombings.
- Late last year, the Kabul regime temporarily succeeded in suborning Pakistani tribal dissidents in the border area; only by a combination of force and bribery was Islamabad able to quell the resulting uprising. The allegiance of these tribes, however, is notoriously short lived, and Kabul is likely to continue its subversive efforts.
- Enforcement of the ban on poppy cultivation along the Frontier at the start of the early fall crop season is likely to spark protests. Embassy reporting indicates the government has delayed clarifying its policy on this year's crop out of concern for local reaction.

Reporting from the US Consulate in Peshawar suggests that Kabul has largely succeeded in turning local popular opinion against the nearly 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The government probably hopes its belated steps—measures to restrict the movement of refugees, the formation of special antiterrorist units, and efforts to retaliate militarily against Afghan air violations—will be enough to shore up public confidence in Islamabad's ability to protect Pakistanis along the border and prevent rising domestic pressure for a peace settlement with Kabul.

Key Indicators To Watch

Most likely scenario: Benazir Bhutto mounts a campaign of "people power" but intensifies pressure in a measured way, and Junejo prevails for the next six months:

- Bhutto and the People's Party organize numerous late summer rallies, but they fall short of creating a regime-threatening crisis atmosphere.
- Army support for Junejo and Zia remains firm.
- The government passes and enforces legislation outlawing activity by the People's Party unless it registers and accepts regulation.
- Counterterrorist measures succeed in building confidence in Islamabad.
- Islamabad portrays enough progress in peace talks with Kabul to stem rising pressure for early and unfavorable settlement.

Alternative Scenario: Bhutto aggressively presses "street politics," seeking an early confrontation with Junejo, who fails to cope and is replaced:

- Bhutto's late summer rallies ignite widespread antiregime sentiment; other opposition parties collaborate with the People's Party in street agitation.
- Members of the National Assembly defect to the People's Party.
- The economic situation deteriorates, and unemployment among returning expatriates rises, creating greater support for Bhutto's socialist policies.
- Islamic fundamentalist political parties, concerned about Bhutto's leftist and secularist policies, engage in the kind of antiopposition party violence that brought down Benazir's father in 1977.
- Kabul steps up terrorist campaign along the border; the Army becomes increasingly concerned about Bhutto's antirefugee rhetoric and her conciliatory stance toward Kabul.
- The government is unable to contain unrest inspired by the People's Party; the Army steps in to restore order, forcing Zia's departure as Army chief and Junejo's removal as Prime Minister.

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Part 2. Developments and Trends


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The six categories of indicators used in the following charts focus on a broad array of issues that may impact on stability:

- The social change and conflict indicators examine developments such as labor or religious unrest that could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability to rule effectively.
- The *economic factors* link various dimensions of economic performance to potential instability.
- Opposition activities assess whether the opposition can mobilize effective antiregime activity or carry out acts that undermine public security.
- The military attitude and activities category addresses the military's degree of dissatisfaction with regime policies, involvement in coup plotting, and behavior relevant to the political process.
- The external factors category looks at foreign influences that could affect internal stability.
- Finally, the regime capabilities and actions category focuses on what the government is doing that could lessen popular support, undermine its authority, and affect its ability to govern efficiently.

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Mexico : Selected Instability	Indicators										
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	Unpopular changes in economic policies	1-	-	 	 	├	+-	-		•	
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many attitudes/ activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits	0	0	0	0	0	0	- <u>-</u> -	-0	0	0
	Discontent over government action/policies	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0		<u></u> -≚-	1
ternal factors	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0
	External support for government External support for opposition	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Threat of military conflict	0	_0_	0	_0	0	0	0	0	0	
gime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality				[0	0	0	0	0	0
	Security capabilities	0	0	0	0]		0	0	0	0
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Loss of legitimacy		0	0	0	0	0			I	

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leftist insurgents in August appears to have been all attempt to divert public attention from economic problems. Both sides are trying to mobilize popular support, even though neither is optimistic that any significant progress will be made at the talks. The	El Salvador: Selected Instability Indicators	
	Outlook	divert public attention from economic problems. Both sides are trying to mobilize popular support, even though neither is optimistic that any significant progress will be made at the talks. The government position probably will focus on integrating insurgents into the democratic process, a proposal the guerrillas have already rejected. Fighting probably will increase as each side tries to strengthen its military position before the talks.

Indicators

Legend

O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern

Substantial concern
Serious concern
Moderate concern

During next six months to two years

	:	1984				1985				1986	
		I	II	III	IV	1	II	III	IV		11
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent					0			-	_	
Social change	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	•	_	-	-	-	_	-	<u> </u>	 	+
Economic factors	General deterioration	•			<u> </u>	├			-	 	
Beomorni	Decreased access to foreign funds		<u> </u>	 				-	+	 	
	Capital flight		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	-	├					•
	Unpopular changes in economic policies		<u> </u>	 	-					-	•
	Food/energy shortages	•	-	.↓		<u> </u>	 	+ -	+	+=	•
	Inflation		<u> </u>		1	-	-	+	-	+	•
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	•	•	+-	¥ -	1	-	+	+	+ -	-
Оррозион и	Opposition conspiracy/planning		•	-	-	-		+		+	-
	Terrorism and sabotage	•	-	1	-	-	+	+		+ -	-
	Insurgent armed attacks	•			_ _	+-	+-	+	_	+	+
	Public support	ļ	1_				+	+	+	+	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity	<u> </u>	•		-	+-			+	+	-+-
Willitary attitudes as a	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefit	s	<u> </u>		-				+	-+	
	Discontent over government action/policies	•		<u> </u>	-		+-		+-	+	-
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	•	_	<u>' </u>	+-		+-	+-	+-	+-	+
External factors	External support for government	•	•	•		-	+	-	-+		+-
External ractors	External support for opposition	•			_			-		-+	
	Threat of military conflict	4-						-+-		+-	+-
Regime actions/capabilities		•		'	-	+-	+_	+-			+
Regime details suppose	Security capabilities	•	1			<u>'</u>	+	-			- +
	Political disunity/loss of confidence			_+_	-				-+-		+-
	Loss of legitimacy										309916

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Guatemala: Selected Instability In	dicators											·
Outlook		The seven-month tained the critical results largely fro police and securit tion. Cerezo's aus however, although have been muted around may incre that could undern	support of the suppor	ces a properties to the like t	of the 's mo nd hi gram agair d slo keliho	mili- derate s cont cont ast ris w pro ood of	tary. te apposensuinues sing pogress f mor	We by proact is sty to discount to discoun	believel he to a le of raw pand and arnin	e the refor- polic oublic unen g the	back ming y form criti ploy econ	the the ma- icism ment omy
		Prospects for major regi	me or p	policy o	hange							
			ng nexi ng nexi		onths onths to	o two ji	vars					
Indicators	Legend		igible c concerr erate co	1	-		_		ntial co s concei			
			1984 I		III	+ IV	1985 I	11	ı III	IV	1986 1	. 11
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious dis	content	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
·	Demonstrations, rio		0	0	0	10	0	0	•	•	•	<u> </u>
Economic factors	General deterioration	n					 		!		<u> </u>	
	Decreased access to	foreign funds		1		+	<u> </u>	i		†	†	1
	Capital flight			ĺ				Τ.	•	•	•	•
	T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T	in economic policies	0	0	0	0	•	•	•	•	•	•
	Food/energy shorta	ges	0	0	0	0	0		•	•	•	•
	Inflation		0	0	0	0	0	0	•	•	•	•
Opposition activities	Organizational capa		0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	Opposition conspira	 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	L	ļ			ļ					
	Terrorism and sabo		-			ļ	<u>l</u>				-	ļ +
	Insurgent armed att	acks	ļ		ļ <u>.</u>	!		-				
Military attitudes/activities	Public support	militam internate/di site	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
wintary attitudes/ activities		military interests/dignity eer loss, pay, or benefits		0	0	0	0	0	0		ļ	-
		ernment action/policies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			ļ
	Reports/rumors of			i	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	1				ļ
External factors	External support for		<u> </u>	 		_	 	-	 	-	-	
	External support for	<u> </u>				-		1	<u> </u>			
	Threat of military c			t		1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality			 	-		<u> </u>				$\overline{}$	<u> </u>
- 1	Security capabilities		0	0	0	0	<u> </u>		-		}	
	Political disunity/lo	ss of confidence		 -	† <u>-</u>	_	t		<u> </u>		1	
	Loss of legitimacy		•		<u> </u>			-	 			;
			•	-							304	9917 8-86

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Honduras: Selected Instability Ind	icators											
Outlook	Our overall con President Azco on a more even believe that the that the militar suspected subve ed against him probably will co scattered labor	na cont keel. The Presidery's increasives Azcontinue	tinu The ent reas in g a's to	es of arm is sing over slower arms.	effort ned f soft c ly ag ernme w sta derm	s to process on the gress ent, lart in ine h	put c s high e left, sive c abor, reviv is im	iviliant com but covert and ring t	n-mil man there cam educ he ec	itary d con is no paign ation	relat tinue evid aga is ta	ions s to ence inst rget-
	Prospects for major	regime or	polic	v ch	ange							
	L	Ouring nex Ouring nex	t six	mor	ıths	two pe	ars					
Indicators	L	legligible .ow concer loderate c	n				_		tial cor concer			
		198-		II	III	IV	1985 I	II	III	IV	1986 I	II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	0		5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	0	(0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic factors	General deterioration		İ									
	Decreased access to foreign funds											
	Capital flight		. 									
	Unpopular changes in economic policies						0	0	0	0	0	0
	Food/energy shortages	0	- +	0	0	0	0	0	0	0_	0	0
	Inflation)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities		-		-		<u> </u>		_			
	Opposition conspiracy/planning		-									
	Terrorism and sabotage	+	+-,	-			0		0	0	0	0
	Insurgent armed attacks	$\frac{1}{2}$	\rightarrow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maria de la	Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dig	nity O	+	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military attitudes/activities	Discontent over career loss, pay, or bene		+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Discontent over government action/policy		-+-								- O	
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	0		0	0							
Data and I Continue	External support for government	0	_	<u> </u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
External factors	External support for opposition	$-+\frac{3}{2}$	+	_			+ –		+		<u> </u>	. Y
	Threat of military conflict											i
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	0	- (<u> </u>	0	0	 	0	0	0	0	0
regime actions/ capabilities	Security capabilities	- 0	_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Political disunity/loss of confidence			0			<u> </u>	+	<u> </u>	† –	†	
	Loss of legitimacy	$-\frac{5}{6}$		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LOSS OF TEGITITIES			<u> </u>								9918 8-8

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Selected Instability I	ndicators											
Outlook		Prospects in Pana is content with Punable to muster remains in control including complication down were met with the ruling coalitic rallied to Noriega	reside anticol, descrity in the point of the	ent Dregim spite n dru ublic	Delval ne ser press g tra Opp apat elvall	le an time atta fficki ositio	d the nt. D cks c ng n cal	e oppose efense harg lls for while	ositionse Chaing has North	n has iief N im w riega gene	beer lorieg ith cr to ste	n ga rimes ep taff.
		Prospects for major regi	me or	policy o	change							
			ng nex ng nex			o two j	ears					
Indicators	Legend	Low	ligible c conceri erate co	n	1		•		intial c			
			1984		٠		11985				1986	
			Į.		111	. 137	1					
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious disco	ntent	ि	II	III	: IV	I	II	· III	IV	1	II
	Ethnic/religious discording Demonstrations. riots.		I			- IV	0	II O	III	IV 		II
	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration	strikes	ि	II O	5		I	_		_	1	II
	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for	strikes	ि	II O	5	0 0	0	_		_	1	II
	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight	strikes oreign funds	0	0	5 0		0	_		1-0	1	II
	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in	strikes oreign funds economic policies	0 0	0 0	0	000	0 0	_	0	_	1	
	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage	strikes oreign funds economic policies	0 0 0	0 0	0	000	0 0		0		1	II
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage. Inflation	oreign funds economic policies		0 0		00	0 0		† 50 0		1	
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage. Inflation Organizational capabil	oreign funds economic policies s			0000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0 0 0 0 0		† ;; 0 0			
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/	oreign funds economic policies s ities planning		0 0	0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	† ;; ;; ;; ;; ;;			0 0
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotage	strikes oreign funds economic policies s ities planning e			0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0		† ;; ;; ;; ;; ;;			0 0
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack	strikes oreign funds economic policies s ities planning e			0 0 0 0 0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000		† ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;			0 0 0
Economic factors Opposition activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support	economic policies strikes preign funds economic policies strikes planning e cs			0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000						000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Economic factors Opposition activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi	strikes preign funds economic policies s ities planning e ss litary interests/dignity										000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Economic factors Opposition activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career	economic policies strikes economic policies strikes planning e strikes planning e strikes									0 0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Economic factors Opposition activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern	economic policies strikes economic policies strikes planning e strikes planning e strikes planning planning e strikes			000000000000000000000000000000000000000							000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Economic factors Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou	strikes oreign funds economic policies s ities /planning e ss litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits ment action/policies p plotting			000000000000000000000000000000000000000						0 00	0 0 0 0
Economic factors Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou	economic policies strikes economic policies strikes planning e strikes /planning e strikes										0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Economic factors Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for ge	economic policies strikes preign funds economic policies strikes /planning e cs litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits ment action/policies p plotting overnment oposition			000000000000000000000000000000000000000							0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Economic factors Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for og External support for og Threat of military conf	economic policies strikes preign funds economic policies strikes /planning e cs litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits ment action/policies p plotting overnment oposition										
Economic factors Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for ge External support for or Threat of military confi	economic policies strikes preign funds economic policies strikes /planning e cs litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits ment action/policies p plotting overnment oposition										
Economic factors Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for ge External support for of Threat of military conf Repression/brutality Security capabilities	strikes preign funds economic policies s ities /planning e ss litary interests/dignity loss. pay. or benefits ment action/policies p plotting overnment oposition Clict										
Social change/conflict Economic factors Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities External factors Regime actions/capabilities	Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage: Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for ge External support for or Threat of military confi	strikes preign funds economic policies s ities /planning e ss litary interests/dignity loss. pay. or benefits ment action/policies p plotting overnment oposition Clict										

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Colombia	:	
Selected	Instability	Indicators

Outlook

President-elect Virgilio Barco, who takes office this month, does not appear to face an imminent crisis, but, in our judgment, the largest insurgent group still poses a substantial threat. Tight security prevented major guerrilla disruption of the election in May, but insurgent violence continues at high levels throughout the country. Attacks on rural authorities are increasing, insurgents are extending their influence in the major oil-producing region, and the M-19 insurgent group and its allies continue to challenge government troops in the central mountains.

Prospects for major regime or policy change

During next six months

During next six months to two years

Indicators

Legend

O Negligible concern
Low concern
Low concern
Moderate concern

		1984			١	1985			1	1986	
		I	П	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	Demonstrations, riots, strikes			0	0	0					
Economic factors	General deterioration							·			
	Decreased access to foreign funds							!		0	
	Capital flight				_						
	Unpopular changes in economic policies	0					_	0	0	<u></u>	0
	Food/energy shortages	0_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		-0_
	Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<u> </u>	
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities	L							L		
	Opposition conspiracy/planning			ļ					ļ	ļ	_
	Terrorism and sabotage			ļ					<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
	Insurgent armed attacks	L		ļ					<u> </u>		~_
	Public support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		0	0			ļ	+	ļ	.	ļ
·	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits	0	0	0	0	0	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	ļ	ļ
	Discontent over government action/policies					L.	<u>.</u>	<u> </u>		ļ	
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
External factors	External support for government		0		0	0	0	0	0		0
	External support for opposition		L _			ļ	ļ		<u> </u>	.	
	Threat of military conflict					0	0	0	0	0	ļ
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	ļ	
	Security capabilities			0	0	0	<u> </u>		ļ.,	_	-
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	
	Loss of legitimacy	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	9920 8-86

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ndicators											-
	government's por opposition for the demonstrations— versy over press corganized labor r party. In our opin	cline oulari 2 198 -prim censo: emai nion,	of oi ity an 8 electarily rship ns a : Lusii	l reve d boo ction. by le Des stron	enues Isteria The eftist pite t g bas s unl	—are ng th re ha stude these e of s	e slow e politive be ents— occas	vly ur itical en iso and sional	ndern prospolated recent distraction	nining pects d pro nt con urbar rulin	g the of th test otro-
	Prospects for major regi	ime or	policy	change							-
					o two j	wars					
Legend	Low	concer	n	1							
				. 111						1986	
Ethnic/religious discor	ntent	0	-		+ -			⊢ –	-	1	II
Demonstrations, riots,	strikes	0	10	1-0		+ -		+	+	+	
General deterioration			<u> </u>		0	0	10	1	· ·	-	(5)
Decreased access to for	oreign funds				0	0	0	 	 	 	ł
Capital flight						0		0		10	
Unpopular changes in	economic policies							ं	+	To:	ő
	<u> </u>	0	0		0	0	0	ा	()	Ö	0
		L				0	0	0	0	0	oï
			9	<u> </u>	+· — —	0	0	0	0	0	0
						0		0_		0	0
			+								0
			·						: +		0.1
	litary interests/dignity					0				_	
			()	100					0_	010	0
Discontent over career	loss, pay, or benefits			0							
Discontent over career Discontent over govern		0	0	0	0	0	0		<u>C</u>		9
Discontent over govern	ment action/policies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<u> </u>		0
Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for go	p plotting overnment	0		0	0	0	0	0	<u></u>	<u>ာ</u>	0
Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou	p plotting overnment	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<u>ာ</u> ပ	0 0
Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for go External support for op Threat of military conf	p plotting overnment oposition	0 0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0 0	0000	0 0 0	0000	0 0	0 0
Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for go External support for op Threat of military conf Repression/brutality	p plotting overnment oposition	0 0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	00000	0 0 0 0	0.0
Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for go External support for or Threat of military conf Repression/brutality Security capabilities	p plotting povernment poposition	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	00000	0 0 0 0 0	000000	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for go External support for op Threat of military conf Repression/brutality	p plotting povernment poposition	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	00000	0 0 0 0	0.0
	Ethnic/religious disco Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage. Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/ Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support	Continuing econor largely by the de government's por opposition for the demonstrations—versy over press or organized labor reports. In our opin in the final three Prospects for major region of Durion of Decreased access to foreign funds. Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks	Continuing economic largely by the decline government's populariopposition for the 198 demonstrations—prim versy over press censo organized labor remain party. In our opinion, in the final three years. Prospects for major regime or During nex During nex Negligible Low concer Moderate of the concent of	Continuing economic stagr largely by the decline of oi government's popularity an opposition for the 1988 elected demonstrations—primarily versy over press censorship organized labor remains a sparty. In our opinion, Lusin in the final three years of h Prospects for major regime or policy During next six m During next six m Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Ethnic/religious discontent Demonstrations, riots, strikes General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	Continuing economic stagnation largely by the decline of oil reversional proposition for the 1988 election. demonstrations—primarily by leaversy over press censorship. Dessorganized labor remains a stront party. In our opinion, Lusinchi in the final three years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months During next six months III III Ethnic/religious discontent Demonstrations, riots, strikes General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	Continuing economic stagnation and largely by the decline of oil revenues government's popularity and bolsteri opposition for the 1988 election. The demonstrations—primarily by leftist versy over press censorship. Despite to organized labor remains a strong bas party. In our opinion, Lusinchi is unl in the final three years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months to two years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low conc	Continuing economic stagnation and a de largely by the decline of oil revenues—are government's popularity and bolstering the opposition for the 1988 election. There had demonstrations—primarily by leftist study versy over press censorship. Despite these organized labor remains a strong base of a party. In our opinion, Lusinchi is unlikely in the final three years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change	Continuing economic stagnation and a deepeni largely by the decline of oil revenues—are slow government's popularity and bolstering the policy opposition for the 1988 election. There have be demonstrations—primarily by leftist students—versy over press censorship. Despite these occas organized labor remains a strong base of suppoparty. In our opinion, Lusinchi is unlikely to fa in the final three years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change O During next six months During next six months During next six months Noderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Fend deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	Continuing economic stagnation and a deepening re largely by the decline of oil revenues—are slowly ur government's popularity and bolstering the political opposition for the 1988 election. There have been is demonstrations—primarily by leftist students—and versy over press censorship. Despite these occasional organized labor remains a strong base of support for party. In our opinion, Lusinchi is unlikely to face min the final three years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change O During next six months O During next six months D During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Low concern Serious concern Moderate concern Ethnic/religious discontent Demonstrations, riots, strikes General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	Continuing economic stagnation and a deepening recession largely by the decline of oil revenues—are slowly undering government's popularity and bolstering the political pross opposition for the 1988 election. There have been isolated demonstrations—primarily by leftist students—and receiversy over press censorship. Despite these occasional distorganized labor remains a strong base of support for the party. In our opinion, Lusinchi is unlikely to face major of in the final three years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change	Continuing economic stagnation and a deepening recession—largely by the decline of oil revenues—are slowly undermining government's popularity and bolstering the political prospects opposition for the 1988 election. There have been isolated pro demonstrations—primarily by leftist students—and recent conversy over press censorship. Despite these occasional disturbated organized labor remains a strong base of support for the rulin party. In our opinion, Lusinchi is unlikely to face major challed in the final three years of his term. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months to two years

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Peru: Selected Instability Indi	cators											
Outlook	who ar serious Amidst against the mil counte have fu	e members of crisis in Per trumors of of prison seculitary. None rinsurgency arther dama ency has fail	of Sentru sind coup prity parties theles policy ged h	idero ce Prolotti olice s, we y and is cre	Lung, Cong,	ninos ent G Garci large eve t pensi lity w	o, pre arcia a tool ly avo hat G to a	cipita took disc oided arcia	office office of the contract	the me a yeary a isals isals ibiva	ost ear ag ctions again lent g crit	go. s st tics
	Prospects	for major regin	e or po	licy ch	ange							
	·		g next s	ix mo	nths	two_ye	ars					
Indicators	Legend		gible co concern rate con				_	ubstani Serious				
			1984				1985		***		1986	11
			I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	1 -	
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0	0	0
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes		•	•	•	•	•	*	•	_		Ť
Economic factors	General deterioration		•	*	•		-	-			8	•
	Decreased access to foreign f	unds	- 6	*	6	8	-	-	-	1		: -
	Capital flight	11.11.0	· ·	76.	-	-	+			0	0	0
	Unpopular changes in econor	nic policies	+-	 	+	-	<u> </u>	-	-	† <u> </u>	i	-
	Food/energy shortages Inflation		+		ļ·	 	 	_		+	İ	
	Organizational capabilities		┼───		-	 	 					
Opposition activities	Opposition conspiracy/plann	ing	 	-	1		<u> </u>		0	0	0	
	Terrorism and sabotage	8	•	•				4	•	•	•	985
	Insurgent armed attacks		*	•	•	•	•	139	•	40	6	100
	Public support		† -		1	T			0	0	0	0
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military	interests/dignity	0	0					•	•		
wintary attitudes/ activities	Discontent over career loss,				Ī				1	<u> </u>	1 :	L -
	Discontent over government			•				-	•		1	1
	Reports/rumors of coup plot								_	0	0	*
External factors	External support for government		0	0	0	0	0	0	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		-
	External support for opposit	ion	0	0	J	1 -			0	0		10
	Threat of military conflict						0	0	0	0	<u> </u>	10
Regime actions/capabilities			•		•		•	•				
	Security capabilities				<u> </u>		ļ <u>.</u>	-	-	+	- _	
	Political disunity/loss of cor	fidence	•	•	•		•	+	0	$\frac{9}{6}$	10	
	Loss of legitimacy		•				49	0	0	10	\perp 0	

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Selected Instability I	ndicators		_					·			•	
Outlook]] 3 <u>i</u>	President Sarne because of the economic stabil has sparked a c political suppor and labor. Sarn ssue in order to crucial congress who will rewrite	mmed ization onsum t, desp ey also preve	iate, plan er bo ite so is m ent the	dram ome n oving e left on in	natic e pland and re- nuted g to d and Nov-	benefa's su tains critification efuse right embe	fits from ccess wide cism the from	om h in cu esprea from explo	is Crurbin ad put the sive I loiting	uzad g infl iblic oppos and i	o lation and sition reform
	_											
	Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months to two wars											
Indicators	Legend	La	egligible w concer oderate c	n	1		÷		intial conce			
			1984			_ IV	1985			 IV	1986	
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discont		0	O	0	10	0	0	0	0	+	
	Demonstrations, riots, s	trikes		()		0	0		1	†	1	1
	General deterioration			ļ								
economic factors							1			1	Ī	i
economic factors	Decreased access to for	eign funds	=	ļ		<u> </u>	↓	<u> </u>		+	_1	
economic factors	Decreased access to for Capital flight			-	+	<u> </u>	 	- -	<u> </u>	1	ļ ··	1
economic factors	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e		•	•	 		 	 				
economic factors	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in 6 Food/energy shortages		•	•		0		 				
	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation	economic policies	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		
	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit	economic policies		•	0	0	0	•	•	0	0	
	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p	economic policies ies	0	0	0 0	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit	economic policies ies olanning	0	0	0000	0 0	0 0	0	0	0	0	0
	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks	economic policies ies olanning	0	+	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0 0	000	000
Opposition activities	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	economic policies ies olanning	0 0	0	• 0 0 0 0 0 0	• 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
Opposition activities	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit	economic policies ies olanning tary interests/digni	0 0 0	0	• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0000	0 0 0
Opposition activities	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	economic policies ies blanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefi	0 0 0	0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0
Opposition activities	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in each Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit Discontent over career 1	economic policies ies blanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefinent action/policie	(y) (ts) () (s) ()	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	00000
Opposition activities filitary attitudes/activities	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in each Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit Discontent over career! Discontent over government	economic policies ies blanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefinent action/policie	0 0 0	0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	000000
Opposition activities filitary attitudes/activities	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in each Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/parteriorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit Discontent over career 1 Discontent over governor Reports/rumors of coup	ies clanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefinent action/policies plotting	0 0 0 0 y	0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Opposition activities filitary attitudes/activities xternal factors	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit Discontent over career! Discontent over government over	economic policies ies blanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefinent action/policie plotting //ernment	0 0 0 0 yy us 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0	000000000
Opposition activities filitary attitudes/activities xternal factors	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit Discontent over career 1 Discontent over governor Reports/rumors of coup External support for opp Threat of military conflicts Repression/brutality	economic policies ies blanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefinent action/policie plotting //ernment	0 0 0 0 yy us 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0000000000	0000000000
Opposition activities filitary attitudes/activities xternal factors	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit Discontent over career 1 Discontent over governor Reports/rumors of coup External support for opp Threat of military conflict Repression/brutality Security capabilities	economic policies ies blanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefinent action/policies plotting //ernment position ict	0 0 0 0 y s 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0		• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0000000000	000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities xternal factors egime actions/capabilities	Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in e Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilit Opposition conspiracy/p Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milit Discontent over career 1 Discontent over governor Reports/rumors of coup External support for opp Threat of military conflicts Repression/brutality	economic policies ies blanning tary interests/dignioss, pay, or benefinent action/policies plotting //ernment position ict	0 0 0 0 yy ss 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0		• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0000000000	0000000000

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Argentina: Selected Instability Indi	cators											
Outlook		President Alfonsi the government, Nevertheless, we eroding because of pressing problem would significant the foundation for up and labor is re military remains	while to be lieved of his in the his. He had be reduced by reduced to the his of the his	the operation that the control of th	position Alfordity to the important important position of the power of the position of the pos	on P nsin' resoleme ernm th. I	eronistics population of the sented neutral of the sent state of t	st Pa ulari e cou struc econ on is rikes	rty is ty is intry ctural omic begin	in d grad s mo l refo role	lisarra ually ost orms to and l	ay. that lay nch
		Prospects for major reg	ime or ne	olicy ch	ange							
		Dur	ing next	six moi	nths	two_yea	ırs		_			
Indicators	Legend	Lov	gligible co concern derate con				***		ial con concerr			
			1984 I		i III i	IV	1985 I	II	III	IV	1986 I	Ш
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious dis	content	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0	Demonstrations, rio										ļ	
Economic factors	General deterioration										<u> </u>	<u></u>
	Decreased access to	foreign funds		Γ			92 3	0_	0	0	ļ	
	Capital flight									L		ļ
		in economic policies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		ļ !	ļ
	Food/energy shorta		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Inflation		-187	40	***	*	Q)	*	*	্রে	<u> </u>	
Opposition activities	Organizational capa	abilities							0	0		-
-11	Opposition conspira	cy/planning	0	0	0_	0	0	0	0	0		ļ
	Terrorism and sabo		0	0	0				0	0		ļ
	Insurgent armed at		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
	Public support		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military attitudes/activities		military interests/dign	ity 🔾	0	0		ļ			ļ	+ -	1
· · · · · J		reer loss, pay, or benef		0		ļ			 	<u> </u>	1	
		vernment action/polici				-		0	0	0	<u> </u>	
	Reports/rumors of		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—	
External factors	External support for		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 ○	
	External support for		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		10
	Threat of military						0	0	0	0	0	0
Regime actions/capabilities			0	0	0	0	0	O	0			0
	Security capabilitie	es	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
	Political disunity/1	oss of confidence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		-+ -	
	Loss of legitimacy		70	0	0	0				10		

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ndicators										
chet, despite soi crush all protes formed moderal additional antire to convince the Pinochet's harsh can prevent tota Communists are	me runts and the opposition of	mblin to avosition prote ry the ies as rization	ngs in void property on grown	the politicoup, to the coupat on the remarks the	militate al lite coming the coming the country and the country	ary, so berali ivic A ing missing in the ing missing in the interval in the in	eems izatio Assen ionth gover ition Mean	detern. The state of the cive	rmingene ne planse pur e und	ed to wly s pose ler
Prospects for major re	gime or	policy	change							
				to two .	wars					
Lo	w concer	n								
	1984 I		- III	ı IV			111	 IV	1986	
Ethnic/religious discontent	U	0	5		╁		+ 111	+ ' '	+-'	+ 11
				Ĺ	1 -	1	T -	†		1
								<u> </u>		
	4	ļ	434	**	93			· •	T	1
	-	<u> </u>	<u> </u>			ļ			1	1
Frod / energy shorts	 -	0	10	10	0	0	0		0	TO
	10.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$I \circ$	10
	-	ļ	ļ	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>			L
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	10		10	- 0	L		-	<u> </u>		ļ t
	V 0					()	<u></u>	-	<u> </u>	170
						10	- 0	-	\sim	0
			-	ļ			***	L	<u> </u>	1
		0				-	 -		ł	85
External support for government	+							10		
External support for opposition	†							-		
Threat of military conflict			i		0	0				
	1					,	0	0	0	0
Repression/brutality] [l f							
Security capabilities									}	795
		0	0							*#\$2*
	Cnet, despite sof crush all protest formed moderate additional antire to convince the Pinochet's harsh can prevent total Communists are Prospects for major reports for major	Concern for stability chet, despite some run crush all protests and formed moderate opposadditional antiregime to convince the militata Pinochet's harsh policican prevent total pola Communists are expansive for major regime or During new During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concer Moderate of During Negligible Low concern Moderate of During Negligible Low concern Moderate of During Negligible Low concern Moderate of During Negligible Low concern Moderate of During Negligible Low concern Moderate of During Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low concern Negligible Low conce	Concern for stability in Clehet, despite some rumbling crush all protests and to a formed moderate opposition additional antiregime protest to convince the military the Pinochet's harsh policies a can prevent total polarizat Communists are expanding. Prospects for major regime or policy: During next six is a During next	Concern for stability in Chile is chet, despite some rumblings in crush all protests and to avoid p formed moderate opposition groadditional antiregime protests in to convince the military that the Pinochet's harsh policies and the Can prevent total polarization of Communists are expanding their prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months During next six months Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months 1984	Concern for stability in Chile is grow chet, despite some rumblings in the crush all protests and to avoid politic formed moderate opposition group, the additional antiregime protests in the to convince the military that the councince to convince the military that the councince to convince the military that the councince to can prevent total polarization of the Communists are expanding their term. Prospects for major regime or policy change	Concern for stability in Chile is growing chet, despite some rumblings in the militar crush all protests and to avoid political lift formed moderate opposition group, the C additional antiregime protests in the comit to convince the military that the country Pinochet's harsh policies and that only a can prevent total polarization of the coun Communists are expanding their terrorist Prospects for major regime or policy change	Concern for stability in Chile is growing becarchet, despite some rumblings in the military, so crush all protests and to avoid political liberal formed moderate opposition group, the Civic A additional antiregime protests in the coming material to convince the military that the country is un Pinochet's harsh policies and that only a transcan prevent total polarization of the country. Note that the country is un Pinochet's harsh policies and that only a transcan prevent total polarization of the country. Note that the country is un Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next	Concern for stability in Chile is growing because P chet, despite some rumblings in the military, seems crush all protests and to avoid political liberalizatic formed moderate opposition group, the Civic Assen additional antiregime protests in the coming month to convince the military that the country is ungover Pinochet's harsh policies and that only a transition can prevent total polarization of the country. Mean Communists are expanding their terrorist operation Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Serious concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Congenization conspirities General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Concerns Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Low concern Moderate concern Solubstantial concern Concern Solubstantial concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Concern Con	Concern for stability in Chile is growing because Presid chet, despite some rumblings in the military, seems dete crush all protests and to avoid political liberalization. The formed moderate opposition group, the Civic Assembly, additional antiregime protests in the coming months. The to convince the military that the country is ungovernable Pinochet's harsh policies and that only a transition to cit can prevent total polarization of the country. Meanwhile Communists are expanding their terrorist operations. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months to two years Legend O Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Serious concern Serious concern Serious concern Serious concern Concern deterioration Demonstrations, riots, strikes General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Upopoular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Infilation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and subotage Insurgent armed attacks Opposition opposition Opposition opposition Opposition opposition Opposition opposition Opposition opposition	Concern for stability in Chile is growing because President P chet, despite some rumblings in the military, seems determin crush all protests and to avoid political liberalization. The ne formed moderate opposition group, the Civic Assembly, plans additional antiregime protests in the coming months. The pur to convince the military that the country is ungovernable und Pinochet's harsh policies and that only a transition to civilian can prevent total polarization of the country. Meanwhile, the Communists are expanding their terrorist operations. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months During next six months During next six months During next six months to two years Legend O Negligible concern Hoderate concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Serious concern Serious concern Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Inflation Threat to corporate military interests/dignity Opposition ver career loss, pay, or benefits Discontent over government action/policies Reports/rumon of coup plotting Opsettion for opposition External support for opposition

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Spain: Selected Instability Indic	cators											
Outlook	Prime Minister Gonzalez will see his reelection with an absolute parliamentary majority on 22 June as a mandate to continue his moderate domestic and foreign policies. He is nonetheless likely to press Washington hard in the current bilateral security talks to reduce the US military presence in Spain. Basque terrorism continues to be a considerable, if slowly fading, problem.											
	 P	ospects for major regime		liev ch								
	Pr											
	During next six monthsDuring next six months to two years											
Indicators	Legend	ible co ncern ite con		•	Substantial concernSerious concern							
			1984				1985			.,,	1986	**
			I	11	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	0	
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discont		0	0	0	0		0	0	_0_	0	0
	Demonstrations, riots, s	trikes				0	0	0	0		-	
Economic factors	General deterioration					-	0	_		0	5	
	Decreased access to for	eign funds	- 🖳		-	0			0	$-$ 0 $^{-}$	-5-1	0
	Capital flight		- <u>O</u>	0_	0	$\frac{0}{0}$	0	0	0	-0	0-1	0
	Unpopular changes in	economic policies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-5	0 1	ō
	Food/energy shortages		_0_	0 -	0	0	0	0	0	- <u>5</u>	0	
	Inflation		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	ō	0
Opposition activities	Organizational capabili		- 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	ō	0	Ö
	Opposition conspiracy/			 	-		-				1	
	Terrorism and sabotage			-	0	Ö	0	0	0	0	0	Ö
	Insurgent armed attack	5	0	+ 5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ö
	Public support Threat to corporate mil	litary interests/dignity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military attitudes/activities	Discontent over career		0	0	0	0	0	10	0	10	0	ţŌ
	Discontent over govern		0	0	ō	0	0	0	+0	10	0	0
	Reports/rumors of cou		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estamal factors	External support for g		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
External factors	External support for o	pposition	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Threat of military con		T -	1	T -	L	0	0	0	0	0	C
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C
regime actions/ capabilities	Security capabilities		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C
	Political disunity/loss	of confidence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C
	Political disunity/ loss	of confidence	1 ~		1 -				+	O		

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Greece: Selected Instability In	dicators									-		
Outlook		The Greek economy continues to be a problem, but polls show Prim Minister Papandreou's austerity measures have not significantly affected his popularity. He remains firmly in control of his party at faces few real challenges from either the Conservatives or the Communists. Disagreements with Turkey stemming from long-standing Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue, however, have created a tense atmosphere in the region. Although neither side appears to want a fight, the likelihood that a miscalculation could lead to open conflict has increased.										
		Prospects for major reg	ime or i	policy o	hange							
		During next six months During next six months to two years										
					_							
Indicators	Legend	Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Substantial concern Serious concern										
			1984 I	1984 I II III IV				1985 I + II + III - IV				
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discor	ntent		- 11	1111	1 V	+ -	II	III	IV	1	II
C	Demonstrations, riots,			1	ļ	+	+-	-	+	+	1	:
Economic factors	General deterioration				-		\dagger	•		-	-	
	Decreased access to for	oreign funds	1	T	1	+	T	+	•	1	†	-
				†		T -	+	+	•	+	t	:
	Capital flight		1				1		1			
	Capital flight Unpopular changes in	economic policies	-	ļ -		ļ	<u> </u>			İ	İ	1
			-	+ - +		ļ —	<u> </u>	+				
	Unpopular changes in			- 						†		
Opposition activities	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage	s		-								
Opposition activities	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation	ities							•			
Opposition activities	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil	ities /planning										
Opposition activities	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy.	ities /planning										
	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support	ities /planning e										
	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi	s ities /planning te ks litary interests/dignity										
	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mit Discontent over career	ities /planning ge cs litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit	s									
	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern	ities /planning ge ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit ment action/policies	s									
	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of course	ities /planning ge ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit nment action/policies up plotting	s									
Military attitudes/activities	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of con External support for g	ities /planning ee ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit ment action/policies up plotting overnment	s									
Military attitudes/activities	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou External support for g External support for o	ities /planning ee ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit ment action/policies up plotting overnment pposition	S									
Military attitudes/activities External factors	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cot External support for g External support for o Threat of military con	ities /planning ee ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit ment action/policies up plotting overnment pposition	s v.								C	
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities External factors Regime actions/capabilities	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cot External support for g External support for o Threat of military con Repression/brutality	ities /planning ee ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit ment action/policies up plotting overnment pposition	s v.									
Military attitudes/activities External factors	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cot External support for g External support for o Threat of military con Repression/brutality Security capabilities	ities /planning ge ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit ment action/policies up plotting overnment pposition flict	s v.								CS	
Military attitudes/activities External factors	Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation Organizational capabil Opposition conspiracy/Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cot External support for g External support for o Threat of military con Repression/brutality	ities /planning ge ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefit ment action/policies up plotting overnment pposition flict	s v.									

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licators															
Outlook				Recent political events have strengthened the parliamentary majority of Prime Minister Ozal, boding well for his Motherland Party in elections for 11 seats scheduled for this fall. Economic difficulties persist, however, including large debt repayments and high inflation and unemployment. Turkish security concerns continue to be exacerbated, in our judgment, by the Gulf war and suspicions of Syrian encouragement of terrorism. Tensions caused by longstanding disputes with Greece over problems in the Aegean and the Cyprus issue also have increased recently to worrisome levels.											
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	During next six months														
		0			,		_								
Legend	Negligible concern Regions Concern Low concern Serious concern Moderate concern														
		1984 I	ı II	111	IV	1985 I	11	III	IV	1986 I	II				
Ethnic/religious dis	scontent														
Demonstrations, ric	ots, strikes	1,7	(O	0	()	3.5	5.7		1	()				
General deterioration	on	7.5	l .			<u>L</u>		İ	L .	<u> </u>	ļ				
Decreased access to	o foreign funds	ζ	0	2	0		**		C	ļ					
Capital flight						<u> </u>				ļ	ļ				
		- 11	<u></u>								ļ				
Food/energy short	ages	ļ		0	0	ļ ··	- 0	C	<u> </u>		-				
Inflation		<u> </u>							ļ	↓					
		<u> </u>				ļ		↓	_	1					
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			<u></u>	ļ <u> </u>	ļ	ļ			↓	4					
	tacks	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	-		<u> </u>	-	-		1	·				
		1 (1)		-		1	<u> </u>	C .	7.5	-	-				
		+						15	2.5		+				
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				1.7						+_	(-				
				1	-	+			+ -	+	1				
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		ļ	+	-		10	()	0	10	1	-				
occurry capabilities			1	<u> </u>	+	+	<u> </u>	+ `	+	+	1 2				
Political disunity/1	oss of confidence	\cap				l l					1 1				
	Ethnic/religious dis Demonstrations, ric General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy short Inflation Organizational cap Opposition conspiraterrorism and sabe Insurgent armed at Public support Threat to corporate Discontent over ca Discontent over ca Discontent over go Reports/rumors of External support for External support for Threat of military Repression/brutali	Recent political evity of Prime Minis elections for 11 sea persist, however, in and unemploymen erbated, in our jude encouragement of putes with Greece also have increased. Prospects for major regin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Durin Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignity	Recent political events ity of Prime Minister O elections for 11 seats so persist, however, includ and unemployment. Tu erbated, in our judgment encouragement of terror putes with Greece over also have increased received also have increased received by the prospects for major regime or putes with Greece over also have increased received by the prospects for major regime or putes with Greece over also have increased received by the prospects for major regime or putes with Greece over also have increased received by the pute for major regime or putes with Greece over also have increased received by the pute for major regime or putes with Greece over also have increased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignity Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits Discontent over government action/policies Reports/rumors of coup plotting External support for opposition Threat of military conflict Repression/brutality	Recent political events have ity of Prime Minister Ozal, elections for 11 seats schedu persist, however, including la and unemployment. Turkish erbated, in our judgment, by encouragement of terrorism. putes with Greece over probl also have increased recently Prospects for major regime or policy of During next six mo During next six m	Recent political events have strentity of Prime Minister Ozal, boding elections for 11 seats scheduled for persist, however, including larged and unemployment. Turkish secular erbated, in our judgment, by the encouragement of terrorism. Tenting putes with Greece over problems is also have increased recently to we have increased recently to we have increased recently to we have increased recently to we have increased recently to we have increased recently to we have increased as we have increased accern. 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Tensions putes with Greece over problems in the also have increased recently to worrism. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months to two years	Recent political events have strengthened the ity of Prime Minister Ozal, boding well for elections for 11 seats scheduled for this fall persist, however, including large debt repay and unemployment. Turkish security conce erbated, in our judgment, by the Gulf war encouragement of terrorism. Tensions cause putes with Greece over problems in the Aeg also have increased recently to worrisome low to the increased recently to worrisome low putes for major regime or policy change. Prospects for major regime or policy change	Recent political events have strengthened the paity of Prime Minister Ozal, boding well for his it elections for 11 seats scheduled for this fall. Eco persist, however, including large debt repaymen and unemployment. Turkish security concerns of erbated, in our judgment, by the Gulf war and a encouragement of terrorism. Tensions caused by putes with Greece over problems in the Aegean a also have increased recently to worrisome levels Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Ceneral deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Insurgent armed attacks Public support Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits Discontent over government action/policies Reports/rumors of coup plotting External support for opposition Threat of military conflict Repression/brutality	Recent political events have strengthened the parlian ity of Prime Minister Ozal, boding well for his Moth elections for 11 seats scheduled for this fall. Econom persist, however, including large debt repayments and and unemployment. Turkish security concerns contining erbated, in our judgment, by the Gulf war and suspice encouragement of terrorism. Tensions caused by long putes with Greece over problems in the Aegean and the also have increased recently to worrisome levels. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months to two years	Recent political events have strengthened the parliamenta ity of Prime Minister Ozal, boding well for his Motherlan elections for 11 seats scheduled for this fall. Economic difference of the persist, however, including large debt repayments and hig and unemployment. Turkish security concerns continue to erbated, in our judgment, by the Gulf war and suspicions encouragement of terrorism. Tensions caused by longstamputes with Greece over problems in the Aegean and the Cyalso have increased recently to worrisome levels. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern A Substantial concern Serious concern Serious concern A Substantial concern Serious concern Serious concern A Substantial concern Serious concern A Substantial concern Serious concern Moderate concern Concernal deterioration Demonstrations, riots, strikes General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignity Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits Discontent over government External support for government External support for government External support for government External support for government External support for government	Recent political events have strengthened the parliamentary mity of Prime Minister Ozal, boding well for his Motherland Par elections for 11 seats scheduled for this fall. Economic difficultipersist, however, including large debt repayments and high influence and unemployment. Turkish security concerns continue to be e erbated, in our judgment, by the Gulf war and suspicions of Sy encouragement of terrorism. Tensions caused by longstanding putes with Greece over problems in the Aegean and the Cyprus also have increased recently to worrisome levels. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern				

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Morocco: Selected Instability Ind	icators											
Outlook	King Hassan is coming under increased pressure from radical Arabstates for the recent meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Peres bu has not suffered an erosion of political support at home. Nevertheless, the talks almost certainly diminished the King's attention to Morocco's pressing financial problems. Morocco has lost access to IMF financial support because of Rabat's inability to meet Fund-suggested economic performance targets. Establishing a new IMF program probably requires even greater budget stringencies, including cuts in politically sensitive food subsidies.											
		Prospects for major regir	ne or p	olicy c	hange							
		Durin	ig next	six mo	onths	two je	ars					
Indicators	Legend	Low	igible c concern erate co					Substan Serious				
			1984 1 II III		i III				 1 IV	1986 IV 1 II		
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious	discontent	 '	11	111	1 V	'	- 11	111	1 V	'	11
Social change, confiner	Demonstrations,		4		-			1	1			İ
Economic factors	General deterior			!	1	 						
	Decreased access	s to foreign funds	†-·		<u> </u>			1		+ ·		İ
	Capital flight				1	10		i				
		ges in economic policies										1
	Food/energy she	ortages	7.5	1	Titali	()	()	1,1				
	Inflation				-	(5)						
Opposition activities	Organizational c	apabilities		17	C)	C	100	0	1.5			U
	Opposition consp	piracy/planning				ļ			ļ	<u></u>		
	Terrorism and s		1		1	10	- :			1		
	Insurgent armed	attacks	<u> </u>	ļ	· · · · -	0	C	-		1	1	
	Public support		ļ						1			ļ
Military attitudes/activities		ate military interests/dignity		ļ. C.				į.			ļ	1
		career loss, pay, or benefits	+	ļ	-	+	-		+ .	ļ		+
		government action/policies		10		1		1 1	.		<u>.</u>	
		of coup plotting	0	()	()	0	C	0			-	-
External factors		t for government	10	1	1 . 7	10		+	-	‡. ,	,	}
	External support			ļ	+		١,	* -	+			t
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Threat of milita		┼	1	+	-		-	 	1	ļ	1
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brut		+ .	10	+	15	0	0	1	+	ł	.5
	Security capabil		+	$\frac{1}{C}$	1	1	<u> </u>	+	 '	+		
		y/loss of confidence	+		1	15	0	1.5	+	+	1	
	Loss of legitima	icy		1.31	i _				1 .	1	L	09929 8 8

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Egypt: Selected Instability In	dicators										
Outlook	Civil disorder operating or political crist currency she and other new may be fore cuts in the respread acts moreover, the control of the cuts of the	n a very name is. The gostage that ecessities, ed to implicate of public	arrow overn at alro We wose u ed foo disco	midd ment eady is believe npopu od subs ntent.	le grofaces hinde Mu lar a sidies The	ound an addering baral usteri —tha longe	betweet sits a state of the court of the cou	een a and vability count easur k spa delay	n eco vorse y to i er th res— rking	onomiening mportis tre- include wide	hard t food nd, ding
	Prospects for ma	jor regime o	r policy	change							
	•	During ne During ne			o two y	ears					
Indicators	Legend	Negligible Low conce Moderate	rn		_			ntial co s conce			
		198	34		-	1985				1986	
Social shapes/socilist	ru · / r · · r	I			IV	1	II	III	IV	I	II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent Demonstrations, riots, strikes	y 24 24.2	: _9	5.7	0	0			ļ		
Economic factors	General deterioration		_	-	ļ	0	ļ		-	**	79-
Economic ractors	Decreased access to foreign funds		-		-	-	(:	1		- WE	VB
	Capital flight			+	6			1	ļ		نياز)
	Unpopular changes in economic police	eies	-		 		 	*	搬		رفور
	Food/energy shortages			$+$ $_{\odot}$	- C	()		-		† ‴	127
	Inflation						T	-	† · · · ·	+	
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities		 	<u> </u>		6	7.5		C	† · ·	
	Opposition conspiracy/planning				0	0		to	To.	1	
	Terrorism and sabotage		1	1 3		1				1	
	Insurgent armed attacks				C	Ð	1	77	()		-
	Public support						Q.	100	0	†	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/	· - 1	: C	()	1,7	0	0	0	\bigcirc	()	
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or b						(-)		C	1,000	
	Discontent over government action/p		0		C	0	0	(C		
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	Ţ.	0		0	O	C	\bigcirc	0	\leftarrow	
External factors	External support for government		- 0		0	0	0	(7	0		1 .
	External support for opposition		0	0	0	0	O	C	0		
Regime actions/capabilities	Threat of military conflict		_			0	0	0	0	€	N.
Regime actions/canabilities	Repression/brutality		10		0		0	0	0	G,	4
regime decions, capabilities	C 1.20%								0	1	
regime detions, capaonines	Security capabilities				0	↓			12	ļ į	
regime actions, capacinites	Security capabilities Political disunity/loss of confidence Loss of legitimacy	0			0	0	0	0		ar .	185F

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Sudan: Selected Instability Inc	dicators											
Outlook		Prime Minister Safter the election opposition pressu the coming week dating his power. figures have yet t within the coaliti insurgent gains in have shown little	in Apres, but the second in Apres of the seco	oril, is it we ss he line stabli my r outh,	s still belie make s of a ished, noral	enjo eve he es un utho and e is o	ying may expec rity a alrea lange	a related particular tending the control of the con	ative maje progreg key nere a ly low	respi or ch ess ir gove are si bec	te fro alleng cons ernme gns of ause	om ges in soli- ent f rifts of
		Prospects for major reg	ime or p	olicy c	hange							
		_	ing next ing next			two je	ears					
Indicators	Legend	Lon	ligible c concern lerate co						ntial co concer			
			1984 I	II	 III	_i IV	1985 1	II	111	i IV	 1986 I	<u>. 11</u>
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious	discontent	1		•	4	*	•	•	*	•	*
	Demonstrations		\perp				4		*	*	40	100
Economic factors	Capital flight	s to foreign funds		ļ	*	4)	*	•	**	*	*	9
	Food/energy sh	ges in economic policies ortages			•	-	**	£.	1		*	yy4
Opposition activities	Organizational of	ranahilities	+		46	*	*	**	**	€	*	-6
opposition activities	Opposition cons		+			* '		45	**************************************	259		•
	Terrorism and s	·	+	-	ļ		-	-		*	3.	5421
	Insurgent armed				*		59		100	68	88	*£
	Public support		†	-	† <u>-</u> -	<u> </u>			 	1	1	
Military attitudes/activities		ate military interests/dignit	y -						•	0	*	4
	Discontent over	career loss, pay, or benefit	s –		i	:			ļ		1	
	Discontent over	government action/policies	:		1		*		*	*	75	∳ ng:
	Reports/rumors	of coup plotting	1			•	•	•	•	*	*	₹#:
External factors	External suppor	t for government										
	External suppor	- * *			Ι .					*	*	#6
	Threat of milita]	
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brut											
	Security capabil									431	•	6
		/loss of confidence	<u> </u>			ļ	•	45	8 9	sign	[,]
	Loss of legitima	cy	1					İ			1	

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Saudi Arabia: Selected Instability Inc	licators											
Outlook			rania ble sp bolicy as with of mi renue ag th yal fa me or p	of determined of determined of determined of the	of the efender of the efender of the efender of the efender of the efender of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efect of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efect of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efent of the efect of the efect of the efect of the efent of the efent of the efect of the e	natione conting a militation in depression of rainnession in the continues of the continues	on to purificate a great ants, involving essed, many s.	to the terminate of the	cute ne Ar narke ding audi nced g	the wabianet sha Iran facili	var win Peniare had, and ties.	ith insu- is
Indicators	Legend	○ Negli Low c	g next gible co concern rate con	oncern	nins to	two ye			ntial co			
			 1984				11985				11986	
			I 1904	II	Ш	IV	ı	II	III	IV	I	ļ II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious	discontent										
C	Demonstrations,					1.7	10	0	Z.,	0		
Economic factors	General deteriora	ition								<u> </u>		
	Decreased access	to foreign funds				:		-		0	I	
	Capital flight		•			1.7		0	(2)		1	<u> </u>
		ges in economic policies	ļ		_			40			1	
	Food/energy sho	ortages		L	_		ļ			- "	1.7	
	Inflation						10	(*)	1 -	11.	()	
Opposition activities	Organizational ca				1,1	1 1	ļ		1	10	0.	12
	Opposition consp		ļ 	L			()	C;			1	
	Terrorism and sa					<u> </u>	ļ			<u></u>	1	ļ
	Insurgent armed	attacks		10		(·	<u> </u>	1	1 4 .		1.5	
	Public support				1	(.)	1	10		0	0	1
Military attitudes/activities		ite military interests/dignity	<u> </u>		0	0	C.	0	0	0	0	ļ
		career loss, pay, or benefits	l :		()		-	C	0	0	0	-
		government action/policies	L	-		+		0	10	0	0	
	Reports/rumors		(1)		()	0	0	0	10	0	3	0
External factors	External support			<u> </u>	ļ [.]	0	O	0	- C	0	0	0
	External support		ł					1/2		0	<u></u> Ω	-
	Threat of militar			-	1.5	Z'3	0	0	C	1.7	+	-
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/bruta		<u> </u>		(,)	0	10	-	10	+	- i	
	Security capabili		7.	<u> </u>	-	.~.	-	0	0			
	Loss of legitima	/loss of confidence			0	0	<u>C</u>	0	0	+	<u> </u>	1.5
	LOSS OF BOOTINGS	· M			1	1	1	0	10		\	1 52

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Iraq: Selected Instability Inc	dicators											
Outlook		The outlook in Baghdad's expossibly as ear callup of men fighting—if it can ill afford. serious morale leaders appear waging the wa	rly as lat to brace materia Such lose decline	that e this for t lizes— sses w amor	Iran s sum his co will could ng the	is promer. omin proc be co	eparir Bagh g trial luce h ertain qi pub	ng a dad . We eavy to a blic.	majo has c e beli casu ggrav Neve	r offereve to altie	ensive ed a l hat the s tha the al	large he t Irac ready raq's
		Prospects for major	regime or	policy c	hange							
			During nex During nex			two j	ears					
Indicators	Legend		Negligible o Low concert Moderate co	n					ntial co s concei			
			1984			. 137	1985	**			1986	
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious	discontant	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	 	II
Social change, conflict	Demonstrations,			+	 			_	-		1	ļ
Economic factors	General deterior			+	-				+		-	1
Economic ractors		s to foreign funds		 	ł					† ·		<u> </u>
	Capital flight	s to releigh runus		-	-				-	†	· · · · · · ·	
		ges in economic policie	,	_	-		1		-		.	+
	Food/energy sho								 	 	+	
	Inflation						 		-	ł	t	
Opposition activities	Organizational c	apabilities					\vdash		†		 	
	Opposition consp	·							+	+	1	
	Terrorism and sa					_			 	†	İ	
	Insurgent armed	attacks			1		T		 	İ	İ	
	Public support				_					t	<u>†</u>	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corpor	ate military interests/dig	gnity			-			-		† –	
	Discontent over	career loss, pay, or ben	efits						T	<u> </u>	İ	
	Discontent over	government action/poli	icies		<u> </u>	-	1		-		1	
	Reports/rumors	of coup plotting							Ť		1	
External factors	External support	for government									Ì	
	External support										Ī	
	Threat of militar											
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/bruta											
	Security capabili					•						
		loss of confidence		-								
	Loss of legitimae										1	r f

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Iran: Selected Instability Inc	licators												
Outlook		Iran is facing near-term thr low oil prices-essential food increasing fac bitter public c ships, howeve policies. Iran' impact of aus	eat to it—are for items items items items items items items items. Items items	ts st orcir n sh strife over ave	abil ng fa nort e as eco no e litar	ity. I supp radio nomi vider	Reduy clo ly. Toals c po nce coccess	ced resures he do and color licy. If open has,	even and eteric conse Desp n opp in op	ues— leavi oratin rvativ ite ec	the ing all general economics on to	esult l but onom onduct nic ha	of y is et a ard- me
		Prospects for majo	r regime o	or pol	icy ch	ange							
		9	During n During n				two y	ears					
Indicators	Legend	3	Negligibl Low conc Moderate	ern						ntial co s concer		-	1
				84				1985				1986	
<u> </u>				I	11	Ш	IV	1	II	III	IV	J	↓ II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious d							_		1	ļ	ļ	
To the Control of the	Demonstrations, r			-				•	•				
Economic factors	General deteriorat Decreased access			-				ł · · · · ·					
	Capital flight	to foreign funds		_					•		•		+
	·	es in economic policie	es		-					Ť	-	_	
	Food/energy shor	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	-					-	+				
	Inflation		-					† · · · -	 		-		
Opposition activities	Organizational ca	oabilities							-				
11	Opposition conspi									†		†	1
	Terrorism and sal									<u> </u>	1	1	1
	Insurgent armed a	ittacks								T	-	Ī	Ī
	Public support									Ī		1	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporat	e military interests/d	ignity										
		areer loss, pay, or be							!				
	Discontent over g	overnment action/po	licies					ļ			ļ		
	Reports/rumors o								1				
External factors	External support				,					1	ļ		
	External support								. ,				
	Threat of military							•	•	*	•	•	•
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutal	•						-		. .	-	1	
	Security capabiliti					-		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		ļ	-	ļ
		loss of confidence		_				 	-		+		į
	Loss of legitimacy	/	ĺ						i			1	

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Selected Instability In	dicators											
Outlook		Our concern for to a substantial indications that strength. Bhutte grassroots orgation is martial learner party-bate problems have Soviet-inspired	I level to Benaze to spent inization with a sed electron construction to the sed electron to the sed elect	his quair Bhant the land the l	uarter utto's Rama I the mark this f	r, pros Pak dan I anniv ced the all. T	mpte istan hiatu versan he ren The Ju	d in Peor S bui ry of newal unejo	large ble's lding the is of he gove	part Party up h mpos er car	by is gater pate ition mpaigent's	ining rty's of gn fo
		Prospects for major	revime or	policy o	hanoe							
		⊕ 1	During nex During nex	t six m	onths	o two ju	ears					
Indicators	Legend	I	legligible on concert	n			_	Substai Serious				
			1984 I	ı II	III	IV	1985 I		111	IV	1986 I	. II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious disc		•									
	Demonstrations, riot	s, strikes	•								J	J
Social change/conflict	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration	s, strikes n									J	J
	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to	s, strikes n	0	- 2	5		V				J	-
	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight	s, strikes n foreign funds				1	V			· · · · ·	J	
	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies		+			+					
	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies			0 0		. C)	J	
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges		0			C)					
	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges		0 0			C)					
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirace	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges pilities ty/planning		0			0					3
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes is Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirace Terrorism and sabota	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ry/planning age	0	0 0			0 0 0			3.)
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capal Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ry/planning age		0 0 0			0			3 0	3 3 3	3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Economic factors Dpposition activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capal Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ty/planning age ticks	0				0			3.)
Economic factors	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities sy/planning age acks					0			3 0		
Economic factors Dpposition activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capal Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ty/planning age nicks military interests/digrer loss, pay, or bene	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o				0			3 0		
Economic factors Dpposition activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capal Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ry/planning age acks military interests/digr er loss, pay, or bene ernment action/policies	ity Offits Ofies O				0 0 0			3 0		0
Economic factors Deposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes is Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspiract Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove Reports/rumors of c	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ry/planning age acks military interests/digular loss, pay, or bene ernment action/policioup plotting	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o						5	3000		0000
Economic factors Dpposition activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capal Opposition conspirace Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove Reports/rumors of ce	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ty/planning age tecks military interests/digit er loss, pay, or bene ernment action/policioup plotting government	ity Offits Ofies O				0 0 0			3 0		0
Economic factors Deposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove Reports/rumors of ce External support for External support for	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ty/planning age ticks military interests/digrer loss, pay, or bene ernment action/policioup plotting government opposition	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o						5	3000		0000
Economic factors Dipposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove Reports/rumors of c External support for External support for Threat of military co	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ty/planning age tecks military interests/digner loss, pay, or bene ernment action/policioup plotting government opposition onflict	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o						0	000000		00000
Economic factors Deposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirace Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove Reports/rumors of ce External support for External support for Threat of military co Repression/brutality	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities ty/planning age tecks military interests/digner loss, pay, or bene ernment action/policioup plotting government opposition onflict	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o						5	3000		0000
Economic factors Dipposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirac Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove Reports/rumors of ce External support for External support for Threat of military co Repression/brutality Security capabilities	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities gy/planning age acks military interests/dign er loss, pay, or bene ernment action/polic oup plotting government opposition onflict	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o	000000000000000000000000000000000000000					0			00000
Economic factors Dipposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Demonstrations, riot General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight Unpopular changes Food/energy shortag Inflation Organizational capab Opposition conspirace Terrorism and sabota Insurgent armed atta Public support Threat to corporate r Discontent over care Discontent over gove Reports/rumors of ce External support for External support for Threat of military co Repression/brutality	s. strikes n foreign funds in economic policies ges polities gy/planning age acks military interests/dign er loss, pay, or bene ernment action/polic oup plotting government opposition onflict	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o						0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000		00000

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India: Selected Instability Ind	icators											
Outlook	as Sik dor me Ac des Pu	me Minister C being on the d ths in particular mestic agendal ont the territor cords, and Sik spite efforts to njab to restore ment within th	efensiver seem New ial training the extrement of the extr	ve. Po n to l Delh nsfers emist ve se —a i	olitica have of has s calle as con curity	al and crowd faile ed fo tinue y. Ga	d secuded of for in late to a for a	irity ther a thi ast su ttack may	problerd tires the problem of the pr	ems ne to er's F dus in	with off his impl unjat n Pun Arm	the s e- o ijab, ny to
	Pros	spects for major reg	ime or po	olicy cl	hange							
		Dur	ing next ing next	six mo	nths	two ye	ars					
Indicators	Legend	Low	ligible co concern lerate con						tial concer			
		<u> </u>	1984 I	II	III	IV	1985 I	II	III	IV	1986 I	11
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious disconter	nt				39	**	क्षे	64		925	467
•	Demonstrations, riots, str.		1									
Economic factors	General deterioration				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Decreased access to forei	gn funds	_		O	С	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Capital flight				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Unpopular changes in ec	onomic policies			0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Ulibobulai changes in co				4		 	_	_		0	0
			<u> </u>		C	0		0		0	. ~	
	Food/energy shortages Inflation				0	0	0	0	0	0		
Opposition activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation				+						0	0
Opposition activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities	s			0	0	0	0	0	0		
Opposition activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl	s			0	0	0	0	0	0	0_	0
Opposition activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl. Terrorism and sabotage	s			0	0	0	0	0	0	0_	0
Opposition activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl. Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks	s			0	0	0 0	0	0	0 0	0_	0
	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl. Terrorism and sabotage	es anning	.y		0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0 %	0 0	0	0
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military	s anning try interests/digni			0	0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 %	0 0 0	0 0	0 0
	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milita Discontent over career lo	s anning ary interests/digni ss. pay, or benefi	ts		0	0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 %	0 0 0	0 0	0 0
	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military	anning try interests/digniss, pay, or benefient action/policie	ts		0	0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 %	0 0 0	0 0	0 0
Military attitudes/activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl. Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate militate Discontent over career lost Discontent over governm Reports/rumors of coup	sanning try interests/digniss, pay, or beneficent action/policies	ts		0 0 0	0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0	0 0 0 0
	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milita Discontent over career lo Discontent over governm	anning ary interests/digni ss. pay, or benefi ent action/policie plotting ernment	ts		0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 %	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0
Military attitudes/activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl. Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milita Discontent over career lo Discontent over governm Reports/rumors of coup External support for gove External support for opp	anning ary interests/digni ss. pay, or benefi ent action/policie plotting ernment osition	ts		0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0
Military attitudes/activities External factors	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl. Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milita Discontent over career lo Discontent over governm Reports/rumors of coup External support for gove External support for opp Threat of military conflict	anning ary interests/digni ss. pay, or benefi ent action/policie plotting ernment osition	ts		0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0
Military attitudes/activities	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milita Discontent over career lo Discontent over governm Reports/rumors of coup External support for gove External support for opp Threat of military conflic Repression/brutality	anning ary interests/digni ss. pay, or benefi ent action/policie plotting ernment osition	ts		0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0
Military attitudes/activities External factors	Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilitie Opposition conspiracy/pl. Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate milita Discontent over career lo Discontent over governm Reports/rumors of coup External support for gove External support for opp Threat of military conflict	anning try interests/digni ss. pay, or benefi ent action/policie plotting ernment osition	ts		0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0

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ndicators											
	fice. Student unimilitary in June, in the Islamic Chacklash and the earnings plunge, implement critic	nt Barest for while onfered dang the real eco	bang orced Chr ence (ger of egime nomi	ida's the g istian Orga wide has	rule a govern n prot nizat esprea faile orms	at the nmen ests of ion had co d to a The	e end t to r over l ave p mmu resch milit	of hinobil Niger Provolunal vedule	s firstize pria's riked a violente debt	t year olice a nembe Musl ice. As	in of and ership lim s oil
	Prospects for major reg	gime or	policy	change							
					o two j	æars					
Legend	Low	conceri	n	1		**					
		1				f				1986	
Ethnic/religious disco	ntent	 '	- 11	1111	+	- -	11		+	+	II
		+	+	 	Ť	<u> </u>	 	-		1.7	· ·
General deterioration		 	9,78	.24.	43	-1	<u> </u>	-	+	(4)	
Decreased access to f	oreign funds	-,	1-	у.	1 7	<u> </u>	1		+ -		
Capital flight	<u>`</u>		+	<u> </u>	+	<u> </u>		 -	 	łi	
		1-	 						+ -	-	-
Food/energy shortage	s		40		-	€,			134	+	
Inflation		147	12	4.	熔	ils	1.5	14			
Organizational canabi	litios			С	0	O	0	0	0	ō)
			0								
Opposition conspiracy	planning	0	0	0	0	0	0		15	† †	
Opposition conspiracy Terrorism and sabotag	/planning ge	+	t — —	†·				0	0		
Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack	/planning ge	0	0	0	0	0	0	Q	0		
Opposition conspiracy Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support	planning ge	0000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi	/planning ge ss litary interests/dignity	0 0 0 0	0 0	0 0	0	000	0 0	0	000		
Opposition conspiracy. Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career	/planning te ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0000	0 0 0	0	0 0	
Opposition conspiracy Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern	/planning ge ks litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits nment action/policies	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	00000	00000	0000	0 0	
Opposition conspiracy Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern Reports/rumors of cou	/planning ge litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits nment action/policies up plotting	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0000	00000	0000	0 0	
Opposition conspiracy Terrorism and sabotag Insurgent armed attack Public support Threat to corporate mi Discontent over career Discontent over govern	/planning ge litary interests/dignity loss, pay, or benefits ment action/policies p plotting overnment	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0000	00000	0 0	0 0	
	Ethnic/religious disco Demonstrations, riots, General deterioration Decreased access to for Capital flight Unpopular changes in Food/energy shortage Inflation	Rankling social threaten Preside fice. Student unimilitary in June, in the Islamic Cobacklash and the earnings plunge, implement critic Nigerian politics Prospects for major region During During During During During During During During During During During Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages	Rankling social and e threaten President Ba fice. Student unrest for military in June, while in the Islamic Confere backlash and the dang earnings plunge, the reimplement critical economic politics—is configuration. Prospects for major regime or During nex During	Rankling social and economic threaten President Babang fice. Student unrest forced military in June, while Chr in the Islamic Conference backlash and the danger of earnings plunge, the regime implement critical economic Nigerian politics—is divided. Prospects for major regime or policy. **During next six n**During	Rankling social and economic per threaten President Babangida's fice. Student unrest forced the genilitary in June, while Christian in the Islamic Conference Orgate backlash and the danger of wide earnings plunge, the regime has implement critical economic reference. Nigerian politics—is divided over the	Rankling social and economic proble threaten President Babangida's rule a fice. Student unrest forced the govern military in June, while Christian prot in the Islamic Conference Organization backlash and the danger of widesprese earnings plunge, the regime has faile implement critical economic reforms. Nigerian politics—is divided over supplement or policy change Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months to two years and the policy change of the policy change of the policy change or policy chan	Rankling social and economic problems of threaten President Babangida's rule at the fice. Student unrest forced the government military in June, while Christian protests of in the Islamic Conference Organization has backlash and the danger of widespread conference organization has backlash and the danger of widespread conference organization has backlash and the danger of widespread conference organization. The Nigerian politics—is divided over support Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Demonstrations, riots, strikes General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation	Rankling social and economic problems conting threaten President Babangida's rule at the end fice. Student unrest forced the government to a military in June, while Christian protests over I in the Islamic Conference Organization have pushed backlash and the danger of widespread communication and the danger of widespread communication have pushed backlash and the danger of widesp	Rankling social and economic problems continue, in threaten President Babangida's rule at the end of hi fice. Student unrest forced the government to mobil military in June, while Christian protests over Niger in the Islamic Conference Organization have provol backlash and the danger of widespread communal vearnings plunge, the regime has failed to reschedule implement critical economic reforms. The military—Nigerian politics—is divided over support for Baban Prospects for major regime or policy change **During next six months** **During next six months** **During next six months to two years* **Legend** **Negligible concern** **Low concern** **Moderate concern** **Moderate concern** **Demonstrations, riots, strikes* **General deterioration** **Demonstrations, riots, strikes* **General deterioration** **Decreased access to foreign funds** **Capital flight** **Unpopular changes in economic policies** **Food/energy shortages** **Inflation** **Inflation** **A	Rankling social and economic problems continue, in our threaten President Babangida's rule at the end of his firs fice. Student unrest forced the government to mobilize p military in June, while Christian protests over Nigeria's r in the Islamic Conference Organization have provoked a backlash and the danger of widespread communal violent earnings plunge, the regime has failed to reschedule deb implement critical economic reforms. The military—a ke Nigerian politics—is divided over support for Babangida Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Serious concern	Rankling social and economic problems continue, in our view, threaten President Babangida's rule at the end of his first year fice. Student unrest forced the government to mobilize police a military in June, while Christian protests over Nigeria's memb in the Islamic Conference Organization have provoked a Musbacklash and the danger of widespread communal violence. At earnings plunge, the regime has failed to reschedule debts or implement critical economic reforms. The military—a key fact Nigerian politics—is divided over support for Babangida. Prospects for major regime or policy change During next six months During next six months During next six months to two years Legend Negligible concern Low concern Moderate concern Low concern Moderate concern Serious concern Serious concern Serious concern Serious concern Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation

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Regime actions/capabilities

Repression/brutality
Security capabilities

Loss of legitimacy

Political disunity/loss of confidence

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Somalia:												
Selected Instability Indic	cators											
Outlook	-	President Siad's bru has heightened tens among the leading Samantar ran the r but the ruling tribe manders—kept a cl ered moving agains well, however, and government affairs	ions candi egim incose v t him	betwoodates dates dure cludir vatch if the	een ristostostostostostostostostostostostostos	val tracee iad's ad's saman esider	ribes d him stay on ar ntar a nt die ue to	and and abroad seven abroad sev	spark ce Pr ad fo veral eport aman a ce	ed jo eside or trea Arm edly tar p	ckeyint atmen y con consider	ing nt, n- d- med
		Prospects for major regim		licy ch	ange							
		During										
		During	next:	ix moi	nths to	wo yea	rs					
Indicators	Legend	Low c	rible co oncern ate con						ial con concerr			
			1984			IV	1985 I	II	III	IV	1986 I +	II
Control down on American	Ethnic/religious dis	scontent	I	II	III	1						
Social change/conflict	Demonstrations, ric		0	0	5	O	\circ	0	\circ	0	0	0
Economic factors	General deterioration		Q.	()	0	0	0		0	O	0	0
Leononic ractors	Decreased access to	o foreign funds					0	<u> </u>	0	0	$_{\rm o}$	\circ
	Capital flight		O.	0	0	0_	0	0_	0	0_		
		in economic policies	O	O	0	0	0	<u> </u>	0	0		_ 0
	Food/energy short			0_	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
	Inflation					L				0	0	
Opposition activities	Organizational cap	abilities	0		0_	0	0	0	0		0	
~ FF	Opposition conspira			ļ	<u></u>	<u> </u>	ļ			l		٠,
	Terrorism and sabo	otage	0	<u>O</u>	0	0_	0	0_	0	0_	0	C
	Insurgent armed at	itacks	<u> </u>	ļ	<u> </u>							
	Public support		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate	e military interests/dignity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	2
•		reer loss, pay, or benefits	<u> </u>	1		-		0	10	0		+ (
	Discontent over go	overnment action/policies	0	0	0	0	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	+	-	 	+ -
	Reports/rumors of		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		-
External factors	External support f		0_	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	External support f		<u> </u>	 	+-	-	1-	-	+	<u> </u>	+	1
	Threat of military		+-	1	1	 		+-	+	-	+	+
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutali		0	+0	0	0		-	+	+	1	1
	Security capabilities		 		+-	+-	+_	0	0	+-	0	+
	Political disunity/ Loss of legitimacy			0	0	0	0	10	0	$+\frac{0}{6}$	10	
						1 ()		1 5)	1 1	1 0		

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Kenya: Selected Instability	Indicators										
Outlook	Our overall confollowing the endered president Moi politician of the Kenya's top makes Somali general Although the general criticism, we be revenues and respective to the solution of the sol	pisode maner e influ litary whon overni elieve	of travered ential posite Moinent's the real posite the real posite the real posite the real posite the real posite posit	ibal id aga l riva ion h i chos s eco:	inresinst ' I Kik as pa se for	t in A Vice Tuyu ssed his p	April Presi ethni smoo profes icies l	in who dent c growthly to sional have a	Kiba Kiba up. In to an lism	upporki, se n add ethn and l	rters (nior ition, ic oyalty
	Prospects for major i	egime o	policy	chang							
		uring ne uring ne			to two	wars					
Indicators	L	egligible ow conce oderate	rn			9		antial c us conc			
		198				198				1986	, ,
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	+ -	II	111	IV	I	II	III	IV	1	 II
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes	0	0	10	10	+	10			ļ	
Economic factors	General deterioration	- 		+	10	╁—	+ 0	+ 0	10	╁	10
	Decreased access to foreign funds	0	0	0	10	0	- 0	+	0	0	ļ
	Capital flight	0	0	0	+-0	0		+0	10	10	+ 0
	Unpopular changes in economic policies	0		Ť 0	0	0	10	0	0	0	1.
	Food/energy shortages					1	0	0		Ťŏ	0
Opposition activities	Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
opposition activities	Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning	_ 0	O	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Terrorism and sabotage	0		_0_	0	0	0			I	1
	Insurgent armed attacks	10	10-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Public support	10	0	0	0_	0	0	0	0	0	0
dilitary attitudes/activities	Threat to corporate military interests/digni	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefit	ty O	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
	Discontent over government action/policie	-	10	0	0	0	0	0			
	Reports/rumors of coup plotting	<u>-</u>	0	0		0	0	-	L	0	0
xternal factors	External support for government	10	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
	External support for opposition	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Threat of military conflict				0	0	0	0_	0	0	0
egime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Security capabilities	10	0	0	0		0	0	_0	0	0
	Political disunity/loss of confidence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Loss of legitimacy	0	0	0	0	0	 	0	0	0	0
		 -				<u> </u>	0	0	0	_O	0

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Laire: Selected Instability Indi	cators	-										
Outlook		President Mobutu face daunting econ civilian and militar and reflects his growing to the US Embangola is planning retaliation for Zai Independence of A	omic y sala wing of IN passy, to re re's su	probaries frust MF-st Mot new	lems. place ration uppor outu r suppor	His the sthe with ted a emai ort to he N	recen IMF h wha uster ns de Zair	t dec prog it he ity. N eply ian d	ision gram sees Mean conce isside	to in ject as the while erned ents in	opard opard e limi , acco that	e ly ited ord-
		P		lies el								
		Prospects for major regin										
		Durir. Durir	g next :	six mo six mo	ntns nths to	two yea	ırs					
		2									. —	
Indicators	Legend		igible co concern rate cor				•		ial con concerr			
			 1984 I				1985 I	II)	III	IV	1986 I	II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious d	iscontent	 '-									
Social change/ conflict	Demonstrations, r		†	0	0	0	$\overline{}$	0	0	0		
Economic factors	General deteriorat											
Economic ractors	Decreased access		7.5	0	0	0	0	0		0	9	<u></u>
	Capital flight	<u> </u>	1	()	0	0	0	O		0		
		es in economic policies							0			
	Food/energy short								0			्
	Inflation											<u> </u>
Opposition activities	Organizational ca	pabilities								ļ	L	ļ <u>.</u>
oblaman am	Opposition conspi		\perp		J					<u> </u>		
	Terrorism and sa									ļ — -		-
	Insurgent armed				\Box	_		L		ļ — -	ļ	-
	Public support					ļ	\perp		1_	 _	<u></u>	
Military attitudes/activities	Threat to corpora	te military interests/dignit	y :	\perp 0			0	-0	0			10
J	Discontent over	career loss, pay, or benefi	ts	ļ		ļ	+-	+	<u> </u>	+-	<u></u>	1_
	Discontent over	government action/policie	s C	0	+	0	0	0	10	10	$\frac{1}{2}$	10
	Reports/rumors	of coup plotting	<u> </u>	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	
External factors	External support			- 0			\perp°	਼	<u> </u>	10	<u> </u>	T 2
	External support	for opposition	+0		 -	+	+	-	-	+	+ -	-
	Threat of militar				+	-	0	+	+-	+	 	+-
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/bruta		 	 	+-	+-	-	+ _	+	+-	† ~	ļ
	Security capabili	ties	¥?	- 누으			1.0	0	0	100	100	4
		/loss of confidence	4_	1-		-		0	0		10	$\frac{1}{2}$
	Loss of legitima	cy						0	0	\perp_{0}		09940 8

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Selected Instability Inc	licators										
Outlook	Substantial viole	nce co	ntinu	es in	the l	black	towr	ships			
	Substantial Viole	100 00						_	1	ins th	1e
	backing of the va	st ma		_					-		
	powers that mak										-
	future. Pretoria i imposed in June; gency in any par believes it must i ships if it is to pr	s unlile new lest of the new l	cely tegislate couffy eff	o eas ation intry. orts 1	e the allow In o	hars vs for ur vic	h sec a de ew, th its c	factorie gorontro	mea stat vernr ol in t	sures e of e nent	it mer- now
	Prospects for major reg	ime or p	olicy ci	hange							
	⊕ Dur	ing next ing next	six mo	onths	o two ju	ears					
Indicators	Low	ligible c concern lerate co			-			ntial concer			
		1984 I	ı II	III	IV	1985 I	ı II	1 III	IV	1986 I	II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious discontent	1				+					_
	Development of the small of			_	-	†	+		+	+ .	
	Demonstrations, riots, strikes				•	•	•	0	•	4	4
Economic factors	General deterioration	+ 0	0		•	•	•	0	•	*	
Economic factors		0		ō	0	0	•	0	•	40	\$
Economic factors	General deterioration		0	<u></u>			0			ļ	
Economic factors	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds	0	0		0	0				ļ	
Economic factors	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight	0	0		0	0	0	0	•	'Maga	'MgBA'
Economic factors	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies	0	0 0 0		0	0	0	0	•	*	78°
	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages	0	0 0 0		0	0	0	0	•	*	78°
	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation	0 0	0 0 0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0	0	0	78°
	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities	0 0	0 0 0 0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0
	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning	0 0	0 0 0 0	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0
Economic factors Opposition activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0 0	0 0	0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0
Opposition activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0 0	0 0	0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0
Opposition activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0
Opposition activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignite	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0	0 0
Opposition activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignit Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefit	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0	0 0
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignit Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefi Discontent over government action/policie	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0.0	0 0	0 0
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignit Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefit Discontent over government action/policie Reports/rumors of coup plotting	0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0	0.0	0 0	0 0
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignit Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefit Discontent over government action/policie Reports/rumors of coup plotting External support for government	0 0 0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0			0 0
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities External factors	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignit Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefit Discontent over government action/policie Reports/rumors of coup plotting External support for government External support for opposition	0 0 0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0			0 0
	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignit Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefi Discontent over government action/policie Reports/rumors of coup plotting External support for opposition Threat of military conflict	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0			
Opposition activities Military attitudes/activities External factors	General deterioration Decreased access to foreign funds Capital flight Unpopular changes in economic policies Food/energy shortages Inflation Organizational capabilities Opposition conspiracy/planning Terrorism and sabotage Insurgent armed attacks Public support Threat to corporate military interests/dignit Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefit Discontent over government action/policie Reports/rumors of coup plotting External support for government External support for opposition Threat of military conflict Repression/brutality	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		0 0 0 0 0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000		0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	000000000000000000000000000000000000000			

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Philippines:												
Selected Instability Inc	dicators											
Outlook		President Aquin convening a con insurgents. We infighting in the abortive coup by on the military. continue to with stability. If Aquiyear, she stands	stitution believe Cabing Marco Both fold in ino fai	onal conal conal conal conal consider consider consider consider consider consider consider conal consider cons	ever, ntinu yalist n and nent susta	ission that e to l s und Filin funds in the	n and basic hamp lersco bino to be econo	initi e prober he ores A ousing ause nomic	ating blems or effor Aquir essme of cor	talks such orts. 'oo's den pro ncerr	s with h as The r lepend obably ns ove	ecent dence y will r
		_	gime or pring nextring next	six me	onths	two y	ears					
Indicators	Legend	Lo	gligible o w concerr oderate co	1			=		itial co concer			
				· II	111		1985	· II		ı IV	1986	. II
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious dis										0	
Economic factors	General deterioration Decreased access to Capital flight	on	0	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0 0
	Food/energy shorta		0	•	•	•		0	0	0	0	0
Opposition activities	Organizational capa Opposition conspira Terrorism and sabo Insurgent armed att	cy/planning tage	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	0		•
Military attitudes/activities	Discontent over car Discontent over gov	military interests/digni eer loss, pay, or benef /ernment action/policie	its	0	0			•	•	•		
External factors	External support fo External support fo Threat of military of	r government r opposition	0	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0	0	0 0 0	0 0
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutalit Security capabilities Political disunity/lo Loss of legitimacy	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	0		0	0	0		•		0	0
	Loss of reginnacy	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,										942 8-86


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Social change/conflict Ethn Dem Economic factors Gene Capi Unpe Fooc Infla	end	Dur O Neg Low	and p edged cial re We be y wou en alre ild pro r's nat ime or p ing next ing next concern	\$2.5 quire lieve ld fur eady duce ional	ng the billion ment a fair ther sever polit electrons	e nate on in s for lure to alien ical price ical price on a	ion in June, the foy the ate the employeroble ars	nto d but iscal e gov he be bymer ems f aches	eeper the ar year, ernm leagu nt—e	rece mour, which ent the destination	ssion It fall the cor o fost busin ated	s far uld ter ness at 35			
Social change/conflict Ethn Dem Economic factors Gene Capi Unp Fooc Infla	end	O Dur Dur	ing next ing next ligible co	six mo six mo oncern	nths	two je	⊕ \$		tial co	иганн					
Social change/conflict Ethn Dem Economic factors Gene Capi Unpo Fooc Infla	rend	O Dur Dur	ing next ing next ligible co	six mo six mo oncern	nths	two je	⊕ \$		tial co	поанн					
Social change/conflict Ethn Dem Economic factors Gene Capi Unpo Fooc Infla	rend	Dur O Neg Low	ing next ligible co	six mo		two _y e	⊕ \$		tial co	исанн					
Social change/conflict Ethn Dem Economic factors Gene Capi Unpo Fooc Infla	end	Low	concern				_		tial cor	исокн	-				
Economic factors Gene Decr Capi Unp Fooc Infla		Мог	lerate co. -	ncern				, i i ous	concer						
Economic factors Gene Decr Capi Unp Fooc Infla				Moderate concern											
Economic factors Gene Decr Capi Unp Fooc Infla			1984 1	II	III	IV	1985 I	II	_i III	IV	1986 1	II			
Economic factors Gene Decr Capi Unp Fooc Infla	ic/religious di	scontent	0	0											
Decr Capi Unp Food Infla	onstrations, rie	ots, strikes	0	0				0	0	0	0	0			
Capi Unpo Food Infla	eral deteriorati	on	0	0	0	0	0	0			9	-			
Unpo Food Infla		o foreign funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1			
Food Infla	tal flight			0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
Infla	Unpopular changes in economic policies			0	0		0	0	0	0		i			
	d/energy short	ages	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Opposition activities Orga		- In this is a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
0	inizational cap			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	osition conspir			0	0			0	0	0	0	0			
	orism and sabo		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	ic support	itacks	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
		military interests/digni		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
		reer loss, pay, or benefi		<u> </u>	0	0	0	. <u> </u>	0	0	0	0			
		overnment action/policie		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
		coup plotting	0	0	0	0	ō	0	. 0	0	0	0			
		or government	0	0	0	0	ō	0	ō	0	0	0			
	External support for opposition		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
·	eat of military			1			0	0	0	0	0	0			
Regime actions/capabilities Repr	ression/brutali	ty													
Secu	rity capabilitie	es	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Polit	ical disunity/l	oss of confidence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Loss	of legitimacy		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			

South Korea : Selected Instability Inc	dicators													
Outlook		Both the governme compromise on the signaled some flewer, that an agreed continue to have a for stability. President a pall over the continued impassed its campaign this	ie key ibilit nent o substa dent ie Asi	y issumy. Boon contial Chur an G	e of deth side nstitution concerns the concerns will ames	lirect les ar itionation, tern, try h	presi e prival refe there ard to coul	dent vately orm of fore, o avo in lat	ial el y pessoan b abou id ac ie Se	ectionsimis real the terminate	ns, hatic, he ched pros that ber, t	ave owever. We pects could out a		
		Prospects for major regime or policy change												
	 → During next six months → During next six months to two years 													
Indicators	Legend		ligible c concern erate co	ı		<u> </u>	_		bstantial concern rious concern					
			1984 I	II	III	IV	1985 I	ı II	III	+ IV	1986 I	ı II		
Social change/conflict	Ethnic/religious di	scontent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
· ·	Demonstrations, ri		Ť	-	Ť	•	•	•	•	•	Ť	Š		
Economic factors	General deteriorati	on	0	0	0	0	0				0	0		
	Decreased access to foreign funds			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Capital flight			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	Unpopular changes in economic policies			0	0	0	0	0				0		
	Food/energy shortages			0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0		
	Inflation	*****	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Opposition activities	Organizational capabilities		0	0	0	ļ	<u> </u>				1			
	Opposition conspiracy/planning			<u> </u>	ļ <u></u>					ļ	ļ. •	ļ		
	Terrorism and sabotage		ļ	<u> </u>	ļ		<u> </u>			_	ļ			
	Insurgent armed a	itacks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		ļ. <u>Q</u>	0		
Military attitudes/activities	Public support		0	0	0	0	<u> </u>		-	 	ļ			
williary attitudes/ activities	Threat to corporate military interests/dignity		-	0	0	0	 _ _ 			<u> </u>	-			
	Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits		 	0	0	0	0_	0	0	0	-	0		
	Discontent over government action/policies		0	0	0	0			_			1		
External factors	Reports/rumors of coup plotting		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	External support for government External support for opposition		†	+	+			0	0	0	<u> </u>	1		
	Threat of military						0	0	0	0	0	0		
Regime actions/capabilities	Repression/brutali		6	0	0		Ť		Ŭ		Ĭ			
	Security capabilitie	<u> </u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Political disunity/l		0	0	0	0	<u> </u>	<u>~</u>	_		Ť	1		
	Loss of legitimacy			+	+		•		-	4	+	+		

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


Retrospective Annex		25X1
Instability Patterns and Trends, 1984-86	Mathedalogical Nation	
This section reviews overall instability trends as published in the Political Instability Quarterly since 1984. During this period, coups or regime changes have occurred in four of the countries covered—Sudan, Nigeria, Panama, and the Philippines. We found that the rankings reflecting our level of concern usually anticipated what actually happened. The "Danger Zone"	The use of half circles to rank indicators was begun in the first quarter of 1986. As a result, some blue trend lines show an abrupt change from 1985 to 1986. The trend dropped markedly in Morocco and Turkey and somewhat less in Colombia and Zaire. The trend increased more sharply than it otherwise would have in Egypt and South Africa. For simplicity of presentation, the yellow and red lines at the bottom of the graph aggregate both half and full circles.	25X1
In order to track variations in our level of concern that a country might experience major regime or policy change, we generated a composite blue trend line tracing the analysts' level of concern for each quarter	One indicator—the threat of external military conflict—was not introduced until the first quarter of 1985. We have retroactively ranked this indicator for each quarter in 1984 to keep the number of indicators	25X1
on each country. As an analyst's concern grows (and the blue line rises), the level of instability in a country should be mounting. In preparing this retrospective analysis, we found that change was more likely to be imminent when a country's total score exceeded 65 and the blue line crossed into the area we have labeled the "danger zone." In Sudan, Nigeria, and the Philippines, the trend line was continuously above 65.	For the first time in two years <i>Iran</i> is now below the zone. South Korea had been moving rapidly toward the danger zone in 1985, but developments in the past two quarters have halted the rise. The <i>Philippines</i> fell dramatically from the zone following Marcos's departure. Our concern level for other countries like Brazil,	25X1 25X1
Of the 30 countries covered, about a third are in or approaching the danger zone. Of the remainder, about half showed steadily declining concern, with fluctuating levels of concern reflected in the others.	India, and Zaire has been steadily declining. Several countries, including Argentina and Mexico, have fluctuated at generally moderate levels of concern. The most stable countries of the 30 monitored in this publication remain Spain and Venezuela.	25X1 25X1
As of this quarter, Sudan, Nigeria, and El Salvador remain in the danger zone, and Peru—which had fallen out—has returned. Recent arrivals in the zone are Iraq, Chile, and Guatemala. Three others—South	The countries are presented in the same order as in Part II.	25X1 25X1
Africa, Egypt, and Pakistan—are not there yet but are approaching this level of instability. The composite score represents a weighted total using the following scheme: green (one point), half yellow (two points), yellow (three points), half red (four points), and red (five points). It can range from 24 (if all indicators are green) to 120 (if all indicators are red)		25 X 1
from 24 (if all indicators are green) to 120 (if all indicators are red).		25 X 1

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Changes in the economic and electoral arenas have had the greatest impact on our level of concern over stability in Mexico. Concern has grown steadily with a dramatic drop in oil prices and ill-advised economic policies that are causing increased capital flight and decreased access to foreign funds. The trend is moderated, however, by changing levels of concern during new election seasons. While the economic factors have gradually increased concern, variables relating to opposition strength and the regime's ability to control the elections have been more volatile. Concern at the threat of violence rose before the elections in July 1985 and abated when violence was avoided.

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
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The trend toward greater instability since the third quarter of 1985 indicates the potential for violence during this year's elections and the effects of Mexico's worsening economic situation. Economic factors will remain a key predictor of future unrest, as will indicators of opposition strength and regime capabilities.

El Salvador



The overall improvement in stability over the last 10 quarters reflects declining concern over military attitudes and external factors as well as some increase in regime capabilities under President Duarte. Since his election in May 1984, Duarte has gained the cooperation of most senior military officers, hastened the decline in political violence, and helped moderate political forces gain strength. Duarte and the armed forces also have kept the insurgency on the defensive, and guerrilla credibility and support have fallen sharply. The slight increase in our concern since mid-1985 is largely attributable to greater public discontent—which is still manageable—with Duarte's economic policies.


The high trend line reflects continuing concern about stability and about the eventual impact of economic discontent, opposition activities, and security force capabilities. Key indicators of impending change would be military attitudes and activities, leftist opposition activities, and regime actions.

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
Guatemala



The trend toward rising instability in Guatemala through the end of 1985 mirrored the uncertainty over the transfer of power from military to civilian rule. Violent demonstrations and coup plotting over economic policies and rising consumer prices sharply boosted our level of concern in mid-1985. Since President Cerezo was elected last December, instability has improved, but remains high.

Cerezo's emphasis on consensus and his support for the military's counterinsurgency program have gained him cooperation from the armed forces, but he still must exert civilian control over the security forces. The declining economy remains a problem, and Cerezo will need to follow through on his austerity program and better manage discontent. The most important indicators for monitoring Guatemalan stability will continue to be economic conditions, military attitudes and actions, and regime capabilities.

Honduras



The higher concern for political stability in Honduras in 1984 reflected the growing propensity of an emerging group of military officers to become involved in civilian politics. After forcing out former military chief Alvarez in March 1984, these officers meddled in a Cabinet reshuffle. In 1985 several were sympathetic to former President Suazo's plans to disrupt the election, and in February 1986 they removed former military head Lopez. We believe the politicized Honduran colonels are not deeply committed to the democratic process, and we expect rumors of a coup against President Azcona to continue.

We believe that the military will continue to play a critical role in shaping Honduran politics. The country's poor economic conditions, government disunity and incompetence, and opposition capabilities warrant moderate concern, but these areas have remained largely static since 1984.

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
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


Concern about instability in Panama generally was low until early 1985, with changes attributable to shifts in military, regime, and economic indicators. The abrupt jump in concern in the middle of the year reflected the military's 25X1 dissatisfaction with President Barletta's performance, fallout from the murder of regime opponent Hugo Spadafora, and Barletta's ouster in September for failing to support the military against calls for an independent investigation.

Our declining level of concern in 1986 reflects Panama's improved stability. Delvalle's subservience to Noriega has enhanced the prospects of Delvalle's completing his term, and a general strike called in March was unsuccessful. Key indicators of future instability would be military discontent and political disunity within the regime.

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Colombia



Colombia's relatively stable political system has long survived chronic violence by several major insurgent groups. Slowly rising levels of concern reflect gradually building opposition activities, continuing economic problems, and declining security forces capabilities. Heightened concern in mid-1985 was attributable to the M-19 insurgent group's withdrawal from a government truce and to labor unrest. United insurgent actions and growing evidence of narcotics involvement by guerrilla groups underlie the current upward trend in concern for opposition and regime capability indicators.

We expect the trend toward greater instability to continue. The M-19, which spearheaded the formation of a rural guerrilla coalition, remains active in rural and urban areas, and the largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, has exploited its nominal truce with the government, to continue arming and recruiting. An improved financial situation has balanced social concerns, and, unless a longstanding territorial dispute with Nicaragua intensifies, opposition factors are likely to remain the major indicators of instability.

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
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




Venezuela is South America's most stable democracy, and we expect it will remain so. The drop in concern for instability that occurred at the end of 1984 reflected the popularity of the newly elected Lusinchi administration. Growing economic difficulties and diminishing public support since the beginning of this year have renewed pressures on the regime, and the democratic opposition is gaining in popularity. Moreover, former President Carlos Andres Perez—who heads a dissident faction of the ruling Democratic Action Party—is adding his own criticism to enhance his prospects for reelection in 1988.

While a deepening recession is undermining the ruling party's political prospects and President Lusinchi's ability to ensure his party's nomination in 1988, we believe the democratic system will remain intact. Economic factors will continue to be the main source of pressure on the regime.

Peru



The high level of instability in Peru in 1984 and early 1985 largely reflected a stagnating economy, a spreading insurgency, and diminished confidence in the regime's capabilities. The election of charismatic President Alan Garcia in April 1985 and his implementation of populist economic measures bolstered public confidence, but officers remain chary of Garcia's human rights policies and doubt his determination to eradicate the growing insurgency. Instability surged again last quarter after the aborted prison takeover by terrorist inmates, the summary execution of prisoners by the security forces, and rumors of coup plotting.

Garcia's current popularity probably will discourage a military move to oust him, but we believe his government has become more vulnerable. Key indicators of instability in the near term will be military attitudes and regime capabilities, with opposition and economic pressures continuing to challenge the regime.

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
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
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Brazil has enjoyed considerable stability in the past two years despite a complex transition from military to civilian rule. Rising concern in late 1984 and in the second quarter of 1985 reflected, respectively, waning public confidence in the outgoing regime and the unexpected death of Presidentelect Neves. Concern has declined steadily since then as the new regime's legitimacy has grown. President Sarney kept the transition process moving, and Brazil's economic growth last year was the highest in the world.

Since taking office Sarney has not been threatened by coup plotting or significant unrest. His administration also confronted the country's main economic problem-hyperinflation—with a shock program last February. While the government appears to be on good footing, economic and regime indicators will remain the most powerful predictors of instability.



The shifting trends in levels of concern for Argentina reflect changes in the economy and in the public's confidence in the regime's ability to manage it. Concern over Alfonsin's poor handling of the economy in late 1984 and early 1985 was arrested when he implemented a major reform program in June 1985. The program halted spiraling inflation and dramatically boosted Alfonsin's popularity but began to run out of steam in early 1986. Moreover, the unresolved issue of human rights trials for the military continues to threaten the long-term stability of the government.

In Argentina, the threat of a military coup—though currently faint-is ever present. Powerful predictors of such an event would include a severe deterioration of one or more of the economic indicators, combined with heightened military discontent over government policies. Less likely, but still possible, would be a coup precipitated by a threat to corporate military interests.

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
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
Chile



The instability indicators for Chile reflect a gradually rising trend in popular dissatisfaction with the Pinochet regime and persistent protest actions by both moderate opposition groups and the far left, which now are collaborating more closely than in recent years. The indicators also illustrate growing anxiety within the government and the military over Pinochet's intransigence as well as concern about whether and when power will be transferred to civilians. The slight dip in instability in mid-1984 largely reflected a decline in protest activity.

The rises in the trend lines and prospects depict a gradual polarization of society during the past year or so. There have been recent large-scale, violent, antiregime demonstrations, and leftist terrorist activity—consisting mainly of harassing actions—has surged in 1986. The most useful indicators in forecasting instability have been those tracking the opposition's organizational capabilities and the attitudes of the military toward government policies. Those concerning terrorism and demonstrations, while accurately reflecting levels of activity, have been less helpful in making projections.

Spain



Spanish democracy has taken root, as indicated by our negligible level of concern over prospects for instability. The great bulk of the citizenry favors moderation, rewarding middle-of-the-road parties while banishing antidemocratic extremists to the political margins. The principal threat to democracy—Basque terrorism—is gradually receding because of increasing Basque acceptance of home rule, better police work, and cooperation with the French. The other remaining problem is the internal conflict within the political center right. An effective alternative to Prime Minister Gonzalez's Socialist Party is not likely to emerge, however, for several more years.

Despite real and continuing problems, Spain has remained stable. The paucity of warning signs of instability has been a good predictor that the moderation in the country's political life will continue. Indicators of growing unrest would be an upsurge in terrorism and declining regime capabilities.

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
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
Greece



Fluctuating concern for stability in Greece through 1985 reflected political uncertainties before last June's national election and its persistent economic problems. Tensions peaked in the first quarter of 1985 when Prime Minister Papandreou unexpectedly replaced President Karamanlis with a politically unknown jurist, adding credibility to reports of military and public unrest. Subsequently, Papandreou's strong finish in the election and the solidifying of his position justified reducing our level of concern. Concern levels began to climb again as the economy continued to deteriorate in late 1985, but the successful implementation of an austerity program last fall has eased them somewhat.

We see little likelihood of a regime change over the medium term, but instability could grow if austerity fails to turn the economy around or if conflict erupts with Turkey. The key indicators to watch are economic, opposition, and external factors.

Turkey



Events in 1984 raised serious concerns about the prospects for Turkey's newly elected civilian government, as reflected in the indicators. A spate of economic problems—primarily a surge in inflation-provoked discussion among the political opposition about holding a new election to replace the administration. Concern over possible military involvement also grew. Separatist terrorism in the southeastern Kurdish region intensified, and reports circulated that officers were pressing the government to eliminate rightwing extremists from the ruling party.

Our level of concern has dropped as inflation declined and rumblings from the military subsided. Moreover, reports appeared that a working relationship based on mutual respect was developing between the civilian prime minister and the retired general—and former military junta leader serving as president. The trends have reflected the primacy of economic factors for stability in Turkey, while highlighting the significance of internal security issues as a major concern.

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Morocco

1984 1985 1986 I | II | III | IV | I II III IV I II Prospects for major regime or policy change: during next six months during next six to 24 months Composite score a 100 80 70 60 50

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
The slight rise in instability in 1985 is primarily a reflection of economic deterioration and financial decline. Severe droughts in several of the past five years have crippled agriculture—a key source of employment and hard currency—and have put added pressure on imports. In addition, the cost of the continuing conflict in Western Sahara—perhaps as much as \$500,000 per day—has reduced funds urgently needed to modernize the country's agricultural, industrial, and military sectors.

The trend line mirrors the general level of stability in Morocco because of the unique position of the King as the country's religious, military, and political leader. His ability to co-opt the opposition and maintain tight control of the military has resulted in a stable regime. Economic indicators have been—and are likely to remain—the key predictors of social change and low-level discontent in the military.

Egypt

Number of indicators

at each level of concern



The composite instability score for Egypt has been increasing steadily since the second quarter of 1985. The index has been driven upward in particular by our growing concern over social and economic factors—including unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls. Recently, we also have become concerned about diminishing confidence in President Mubarak's ability to provide strong leadership and the increasing likelihood of strikes and demonstrations protesting economic austerity measures.

A series of events since late 1985—the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis, the US interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers, and the Egyptair hijacking—has kept the Mubarak regime off balance and eroded popular confidence in the President. Our concern over economic factors also has grown this year as the precipitate drop in world oil prices accelerated Egypt's general economic deterioration and hastened the need for austerity and reform. Rioting in February by the economically deprived security police raised the prospect of more widespread unrest if standards of living continue to erode. Further deterioration in social, economic, and regime factors is most likely to signal an impending regime change.

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
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
Sudan



The steeply rising composite instability score for Sudan in the latter part of 1984 and early 1985 reflected a serious deterioration in economic, political, and social conditions. In early 1985 the regime of President Nimeiri faced an increase in insurgent activity, a sagging economy, and unrest sparked by food and energy shortages-making the regime increasingly vulnerable to a coup. On 6 April 1985, Nimeiri was toppled after 16 years in power.

The concern level for stability in Sudan dipped slightly in this quarter because the Sudanese military delivered on its promise of an election in April and the new civilian regime has had a brief respite from opposition activities. Nonetheless, the combined weight of the economic, social change, and military indicators—which have proved most important for Sudan in the past—remains formidable.

Saudi Arabia



The Saudi Government remains secure but has experienced two periods of heightened uncertainty. The first, spanning the last three quarters of 1984, was largely because of external factors—the continuing Iran-Iraq war and tension with Iran after the Saudis shot down an Iranian plane. The increase apparent in the last three quarters of 1985 reflects the domestic pressures produced by a dramatic change in Saudi oil policy in August 1985, continuing concern about the financial situation in the kingdom, and growing tensions with OPEC militants Iran, Libya, and Algeria over Saudi oil policy.

The overall trend lines reflect the relative stability of Saudi Arabia. The two most powerful indicators of instability in the kingdom are economic factors and regime actions and capabilities. Others appear less significant—visible internal opposition is nearly nonexistent, and there is little evidence of social unrest or conflict.

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
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
Iraqi stability has deteriorated as the costs of the war with Iran have grown. Increasing casualties, lackluster military performance, and economic austerity—exacerbated by the drop in oil prices—are serious problems that the regime has been unable to resolve. Fluctuations in the levels of concern for the indicators and the prospects also reflect the regime's changing fortunes against the Kurdish insurgency.

There have been no changes in regime thus far, and our concern varies according to Iraq's success on the battlefield. Over the near term, we expect Saddam Husayn to remain in power. The strongest indicators that his position is threatened would be further decline in the economy, regime capabilities, and military support.

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Iran



Concern about instability in Iran grew through late 1985, primarily reflecting the deteriorating economy and the decline in Khomeini's health. The sharp increase at the beginning of 1985 reflected reports that Khomeini was increasingly incapacitated and no longer able to supervise government affairs closely. Strikes also occurred, and there were widespread demonstrations against the war and the regime following Iran's failed offensive that spring.

Our concern over the antiregime demonstrations and setbacks in the war has been balanced by our appraisal that the regime has considerable resiliency. The indicators we believe to be the most powerful predictors of instability political disunity following Khomeini's death or incapacitation, a crushing defeat in the war, or a crippling blow to the economy—have not yet occurred. The likelihood that one or more of these will take place still inclines us to view the long-term prospects for stability with substantial concern. 25X1

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
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
The sharp fluctuations in our levels of concern regarding instability in Pakistan generally reflect variations in ethnic tensions and opposition factors. The sudden rise in early 1985 tracked with ethnic unrest in Sind Province in 1984 and in 1985 with elections for the national and provincial assemblies. Popular criticism about the economy also has been a fairly constant source of concern despite generally favorable conditions. Military factors—specifically coup plotting—grew in importance toward the end of martial law in December 1985. The sustained rise in instability since then largely reflects the development of a serious opposition movement.

The levels of concern generally have mirrored our knowledge of the Zia regime's own perceptions of events, including relatively high concern about the March 1985 polls—elections in Pakistan traditionally are associated with unrest and coups. We believe indicators of opposition activity and social factors will continue as key predictors of unrest.

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India



Stability in India has fluctuated as social and opposition factors—relating chiefly to the Sikhs—have varied. The intensified activities of moderate and extremist Sikhs following the attack on their shrine culminated in the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October 1984, and brought instability to its peak. Levels of concern dropped with the relatively smooth transition of power but rose again in mid-1985 when Rajiv Gandhi returned Punjab to the Sikhs.

Despite the continuing Sikh problem, prospects for change in India have been low to moderate since the first quarter of 1985. Because of India's diversity and large size, serious disturbances in one part of the country, such as Punjab, may not affect national stability. Nonetheless, indicators of social change and conflict have proved powerful predictors of instability in India. We believe the near-term threat to Gandhi comes from ethnic and sectarian conflicts that challenge the nation's secular leaders and institutions. They already have infected the military and weakened the security capabilities of the regime.

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
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




Indicators of instability over the past two years have forecast high and increasing instability for Nigeria's central government. We attribute this trend to a sharp deterioration of the national economy, profound discontent among the military, and widespread popular skepticism over Lagos's power or ability to unify the country's factionalized population and restore its economic prosperity. By early August 1985 ethnic and generational divisions in the military also were intensifying.

A military coup replaced the Lagos government on 27 August 1985, but the anticipated honeymoon was short lived. Plunging oil prices further depressed the economy, and factionalism and violence over regional and religious differences have mounted. Opposition capabilities remain weak, leaving Babangida highly vulnerable to a challenge from the military. Coup rumors have resurfaced, and we expect instability to remain high this year and next.

Somalia



Somalia has remained fairly stable over the past two years, with occasional fluctuations reflecting changing levels of tribal infighting. However, our concern has increased this year because of President Siad's eroding tribal support base, growing military dissatisfaction with the level of US assistance, and chronic economic stagnation. Moreover, Siad's strategy for keeping power—rewarding loyal clan supporters with political and economic privileges while dividing and repressing those opposed to him—is showing signs of strain as he ages and his opponents gradually multiply. Nevertheless, his opponents remain isolated, and Siad maintains the support of the military and the police—the key domestic pillars of his regime.

The most powerful indicators of instability in Somalia have been military, regime, and social factors. Peaks in the trend line usually have corresponded to coup plotting and sporadic tribal clashes. We believe ethnic and religious discontent merits the closest watching because tribalism and intertribal violence—both endemic to Somali society—reflect Siad's ability to manipulate the clan rivalries and, consequently, the general level of political stability.

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
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
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Kenya has been relatively stable for the past two years, and the regime remains strong. Most changes in our level of concern have been due to fluctuations in the political opposition and military indicators, although economic and social factors also have played a role. The decline during the second quarter of 1985 can be attributed largely to ebbing tensions at the University of Nairobi and to agricultural revival following the 1984 drought. The subsequent upward trend in our level of concern reflected discontent within the armed forces over pay, benefits, and politicization of the military by President Moi, as well as reports of antiregime plotting.

There have been no major disturbances or coup attempts in this period, but we remain concerned about the longer term implications of the persistently high rate of population growth. We believe that military attitudes toward the regime and opposition planning—particularly activity motivated by ethnic tensions and linked to the armed forces—would be key predictors of heightened instability in Kenya.

Zaire



Zaire has been relatively stable, with most changes the results of economic factors and opposition activities. Concern grew in late 1984 in anticipation of popular protests against a harsh austerity program and in response to the first attack by Tanzania-based rebels since the late 1970s. The slight fluctuations in the trend line since then reflect waxing and waning protests over continuing economic problems and concern over the potential for Libyan-supported terrorism and rebel attacks.

We believe President Mobutu's political supremacy will be unchallenged for the near term. Key indicators of future instability are likely to be protests over declining economic conditions and diminishing regime capabilities.

^a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone".

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
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Instability Index


South Africa



Social change and conflict factors largely have been driving South Africa's instability indicators to higher levels of concern since 1984. Concern about deteriorating conditions began to grow in late 1984 with the onset of unrest in South Africa's black townships. It has continued to rise, reflecting increasingly aggressive black protests, clashes with the security forces, and the growing politicization of black labor unions.

Levels of concern also have grown somewhat in most other areas. Attacks by African National Congress guerrillas have become more frequent and indiscriminate, Pretoria's security measures have grown increasingly harsh, and South Africa has become more isolated politically and economically—especially in its access to foreign funds. The only indicator for which concern has not increased is military attitudes, which remain a key source of government strength. Although we expect a further deterioration of social, economic, and political conditions, we believe a significant worsening of the regime capabilities indicators would be necessary before dramatic political change would occur.

Philippines



Concern for stability in the Philippines was substantial throughout 1984 and 1985, reflecting the crisis of confidence that developed in recent years under former President Marcos. During much of this period, however, Marcos's opponents still were fragmented. Three indicators appear to have been especially important in galvanizing Marcos's adversaries in February 1986—a growing perception by many Filipinos in the political center that the Marcos regime was repressive and unjust, growing discontent within the military, and an alarming increase in Communist activity. Concern about each of these issues increased as early as mid-1985, setting the stage for subsequent events that triggered Marcos's downfall.

Stability has improved markedly since President Aquino took office, but she still must resolve problems posed by the insurgency, opposition by Marcos sympathizers, and the economy. In the near term, we believe military attitudes will be crucial indicators of her ability to consolidate power.

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
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
^a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone".



Despite plummeting oil revenues and the regime's increasing restrictions on opposition and Muslim political activity, Indonesia has remained calm since the disturbances of late 1984 and early 1985. During that period social conflict and opposition activity rose slightly with a surge of antiregime violence. We believe the unrest can be traced to Islamic radicals exploiting political and economic frustrations and ethnic animosity. The more recent rise in concern since last quarter is due more to economic factors. The sharp decline in world oil prices has forced Jakarta to implement austerity measures that have exacerbated unemployment.

The trend lines reflect Indonesia's basically sound economic position and the ability of the Soeharto regime to maintain internal order. Fiscal austerity, however, may undercut the government's ability to attack the underlying economic causes of Indonesia's political and social strains. Key indicators of instability would be a rise in domestic discontent, greater government repression, and deteriorating economic conditions.

South Korea



Warning signs of instability in South Korea moved upward in late 1984 and early 1985, chiefly as a result of heightened protests and the rebirth of a vigorous political opposition. Military grumbling about President Chun's handling of the unrest also became more audible, as did concern in military circles that public opinion was turning against the military generally. Our concern level moderated somewhat this year as South Korea's export-driven economy rebounded strongly.

Antiregime demonstrations and riots remain the most worrisome short-term indicator because of the potential that a government miscalculation could result in a spiral of confrontation and repression. The increase in opposition activities, as well as the Chun government's blemished legitimacy and apparent lack of self-confidence, carry greater weight in our longer term assessment. We will continue to monitor government handling of constitutional reform as the political transition scheduled for March 1988 approaches.

^a The shaded area above 65 is the "danger zone".

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